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PREFACE 
 
This cumulative thesis presents three studies that investigated the affective valence of 
conflicts in information processing. All three studies have been published in peer-
reviewed journals over the last three years. They are reproduced in their last accepted pre-
print version with permission from the publishers. A short overview of the studies can be 
found on page six, the contributions of the co-authors of these studies are shown on page 
seven. The studies’ three separate reference lists have been included into one bibliography 
at the end of the thesis, starting on page eighty-eight. The numbering of the experiments, 
tables, references and figures has been adjusted to fit the thesis as a whole. Otherwise, the 
manuscripts have not been changed. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
According to a recent theory by Matthew Botvinick (2007), conflicts in information 
processing are aversive. This assumption, its boundaries and its functionality, have been 
examined in three studies. STUDY 1 tested if the conflict priming effect as found by 
Dreisbach and Fischer (2012a) can be reproduced with a different dependent variable, 
offering more clear-cut evidence for conflict aversiveness. Participants had to judge the 
valence of neutral German words or Chinese pictographs after being primed by conflict 
or non-conflict Stroop primes in two experiments. Results show that priming with conflict 
stimuli increases the frequency of negative judgments, thus giving unequivocal evidence 
for the aversiveness of conflicts. STUDY 2 was designed to test the time characteristics 
of the conflict priming effect. In three experiments, the results show that conflict priming 
is present already with a SOA of 200 ms, highlighting the similarity between conflicts 
and other aversive stimuli. Furthermore, Study 2 showed a reverse priming effect for a 
SOA of 800 ms with continued prime presentation, maybe due to processes of affective 
counter-regulation. STUDY 3 investigated whether it is the aversiveness of conflict 
stimuli that motivates conflict adaptation. In two separate experiments, subjects 
participated in two response conflict tasks, a color version of the Eriksen Flanker task and 
a manual version of the Stroop task. Here, the stimuli’s perceptual fluency (i.e., the ease 
of processing) was manipulated in short blocks of ten trials length. Disfluency (reduced 
figure-ground contrast) is associated with the experience of negative affect. Results 
showed that increasing the general stimulus aversiveness by adding disfluency eliminated 
conflict adaptation instead of increasing it. The results of the three studies are discussed 
in the light of current emotion and cognitive control research. 
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COGNITIVE CONTROL - AN OVERVIEW 
 
‚Cognitive control‘ is an umbrella term used for a series of different cognitive processes 
which are often also referred to as ‘executive functions’: the flexible (re-) configuration 
of behavioral dispositions, the stimulus-independent selection of behavior, the 
maintenance and shielding of goals, the suppression of habitual reactions, the suppression 
of competing motivational tendencies or emotional impulses, the planning of actions, the 
coordination of multiple goals and, with special interest to the present thesis, the 
monitoring of conflicts and errors (cf. Goschke, 2002). Although these processes might 
seem quite heterogeneous at first glance (and the degree of their independence has yet to 
be resolved completely; cf. Goschke, 2003; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & 
Howerter, 2000), it is these processes‘ common purpose that unites them: to optimize 
performance in such a way that an organism’s goals can be achieved. 
 Imagine, for example, you are on a diet and have to grocery shop. Your goal is to 
lose weight and to achieve this, you have to dismiss high caloric food from your menu 
and eat healthier, low caloric meals for some time. As your desire for sweets would 
conflict with your desire to lose weight, it would be best to avoid the sweets aisle when 
navigating your way through the supermarket. That is, going through the supermarket, 
you have to monitor for potential threats to your goal and shield it from them by adjusting 
your behavior accordingly. However, avoidance is only one way cognitive control 
functions may tune your behavior to fulfill goal attainment. In fact, cognitive control is 
what renders the behavior of humans highly flexible, adjusting it exactly to the specific 
situation at hand. To stay with the supermarket example, the row of sweets next to the 
supermarket checkout may present a situation of inevitable threat to your goal. Here, 
(spatial) avoidance is not an option. Thus, the only way to shield your goal when standing 
next to the sweets at the supermarket checkout is to invest enough willpower to sustain 
the temptation of the sweets nevertheless. This example shows how cognitive control 
adjusts behavior in such a way that the probability of goal attainment is increased. Simply 
put, without cognitive control, you would be a complete slave to your momentary desires. 
In fact, this is what can be observed when standing next to a row of sweets with a toddler 
that lacks a fully developed cognitive control system. 
 This everyday example shows that the functions subsumed under the term 
‘cognitive control’ correspond closely to what is named ‘volition’ in motivational 
psychology. The term ‘volition’, in turn, is originally based on the term ‘will’ (Ach, 1910; 
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cf. Goschke, 2002) and, not surprisingly, the importance of this construct prompted 
researchers already more than 100 years ago to contemplate and examine its nature, 
purpose and underlying mechanism (Ach, 1910; James, 1890). However, though arousing 
the interest of researchers early on, the notion of a ‘will’ and, by that, the examination of 
cognitive control processes, was ignored or even deemed as unscientific for some 
considerable amount of time1. It was only with the so-called ‘cognitive revolution’ in the 
1970ies that questions concerning the control of cognitive functions regained attention. 
A hallmark definition coined during that time is the qualitative differentiation between 
so-called ‘automatic’ versus ‘controlled’ processes (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin 
& Schneider, 1977). Processes that are considered as ‘automatic’ are triggered ‘bottom-
up’ by environmental stimuli and happen fast and effortless, using up relatively little 
processing resources. In contrast, processes that are considered as ‘controlled’ exert their 
influence ‘top-down’ (e.g., they rest on intentions), happen rather slow and exhaust a fair 
amount of processing resources2.  
An everyday example that perfectly illustrates the distinction between automatic 
and controlled processes is driving a car. If you are new to driving, say, for example, at 
the age of 18, you are most likely driving in a controlled processing mode. You have to 
intentionally recall every step - how do I turn on the engine? How do I turn on the lights? 
How do I brake? How do I not stall the engine? This is, if you recall or imagine it, very 
exhausting and costs a fair amount of time. If you are, on the other hand, an experienced 
driver, say, at the age of 28, you are most likely driving in an automatic fashion. That is, 
you don’t have to intentionally recall how to operate the driving system but ‘just do it’. 
This is, obviously, much less exhausting and time-consuming. As can be inferred from 
that example, processes get more automatic the more they are practiced (Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977). Another major difference between automatic and controlled processes 
is the higher susceptibility of controlled processes to interference (cf. Goschke, 2003; 
Botvinick & Cohen, 2014). Imagine, for example, you are driving a car with the radio 
                                                          
1 According to Goschke (2002), the reason for this grounds in the wrong idea that the term ‘will’ as used in 
volitional psychology implicates a liberal view of the term ‘will’ as used in philosophy. 
2 The qualitative distinction of cognitive processes in automatic versus controlled was fundamental for 
today’s research on the topic of cognitive control. However, it turned out to be too absolute in the years 
following (e.g., Kahneman & Treisman, 1984; Cohen et al., 1990; cf. Goschke, 2002; 2003). Instead of 
viewing cognitive processes as being unequivocally automatic or controlled, the contemporary view is that 
they are placed on a continuum. That is, a process is assumed to be more or less automatic, depending on 
how often it has been acted out in the past (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) and depending on which processes 
currently compete with it (cf. Botvinick & Cohen, 2014; Cohen et al., 1990). 
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tuned in and your favorite show is broadcasted at that moment. At the age of 28, when 
driving in a highly automatized fashion, listening to the radio show probably wouldn’t 
interfere with your driving much. At the age of 18, however, when having to drive in a 
controlled manner, listening to that radio show most certainly would interfere with your 
driving performance.  
 A classic experimental paradigm that is often used to investigate automatic versus 
controlled processes is the so-called Stroop task (Stroop, 1935; for a review, see 
MacLeod, 1991; cf. also Posner & Snyder, 1975). In a standard version of this task, 
several color words are presented in varying print colors. Subjects’ task is to either read 
the color word aloud or name the color the word is printed in. Reading the word depicts 
an instance of automatic information processing, as reading is a highly-trained process, 
at least in literate persons. Naming the color, in contrast, has to be done in a controlled 
mode, as color-naming of words is not something we do on a regular basis. This difference 
in processing modes shows in task performance: as elaborated above, controlled 
processes are more demanding and thus color naming results in increased reaction times 
(RTs) and error rates (ERs) as compared to word reading. Furthermore, similar to the 
observation that listening to a radio show while driving a car affects your performance 
more severely when you have to drive in a controlled way as opposed to an automatic 
way, interference in the Stroop task (when color word and print color mismatch, such as 
the color word RED printed in green) results in much higher performance costs in the 
color naming task as opposed to the word reading task. That is, when having to indicate 
the color of ‘incongruent’ stimuli (interference stimuli, such as RED printed in green) as 
compared to ‘congruent’ stimuli (non-interference stimuli, such as RED printed in red), 
RTs and error rates increase. This interference-induced performance deficit in the color 
naming task is termed the ‘Stroop effect’ (cf. MacLeod, 1991). The Stroop effect is a 
highly consistent finding in experimental psychology and is of major importance to the 
present thesis, which is why the Stroop task is used as an illustrative model in the 
following.  
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THE EXECUTION OF COGNITIVE CONTROL 
 
A further important step in cognitive control research was made by Cohen, Dunbar, and 
McClelland (1990) by describing a PDP (parallel-distributed processing; Rumelhart, 
Hinton, & McClelland, 1986) model of the Stroop task. The authors’ aim was to simulate 
empirical findings of the Stroop task performance in order to learn more about them (cf. 
Figure 1; cf. Botvinick & Cohen, 2014). Thus, while the categorization of processes as 
being automatic or controlled was rather phenomenological by nature, this model was 
used explicitly to elucidate the mechanism behind cognitive control effects. PDP models 
build on the theory of connectionist neuronal networks. They consist of several layers of 
processing units that represent simplified models of neurons (or neuronal networks, 
respectively). Those units activate each other by means of weighted connections 
(representing synaptic junctions). They transform (internal or external) environmental 
signals from layers of ‘input’ units over layers of ‘associative’ units to layers of ‘output’ 
units, mimicking cognitive processes represented in the central nervous system. More 
specifically, in the PDP model by Cohen and colleagues, performance in the Stroop task 
was simulated as energy that flows from input units representing specific stimulus 
features (color and word dimension) over (unspecified) associate units to output units 
representing specific reactions (e.g., ‘say “Blue”’ or ‘say “Red”’).  
 The relative automaticity of the word reading task as compared to the color 
naming task is represented in the model as a stronger pathway between word input units 
and response units as compared to the pathway connecting color input units with response 
units. To illustrate how the PDP model simulates the performance benefit of an automatic 
over a controlled process, imagine presenting the color word RED printed in blue, leading 
to the activation of the pathways highlighted in green in Figure 1. As the ‘word reading’ 
pathway is more developed (i.e., the more automatic process; in the figure, this is 
represented by bold lines) as compared to the ‘color naming’ pathway, the model reaches 
the output unit ‘ “Red”’ faster than it reaches the output unit ‘“Blue”’. Indeed, as reading 
a word is the much more habitual response when confronted with a colored word as 
compared to naming its color, (literate) subjects would, when confronted with such a 
stimulus, most certainly read the word instead of naming its color.   
Now, here shows the revolutionary character of the Stroop model by Cohen and 
colleagues. By introducing a ‚task unit‘, their model for the first time was able to simulate 
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effects of cognitive control in a classic experimental paradigm. More specifically, the 
model simulates the ability of participants to name the color of a colored word stimulus, 
although the automatic response would be to read it out loud. In the task layer, both color 
naming (i.e., the instruction to name the color) and word reading (i.e., the instruction to 
read the word out loud) are represented as units. If the given task is to name the color of 
a Stroop stimulus, the model activates the color naming unit. The color naming unit, then, 
 
 
Figure 1. An illustration of a PDP model of the Stroop task (following Cohen et al., 1990; cf. also 
Botvinick & Cohen, 2014).  
 
exerts influence on the associative layer which results in the increased weighting of the 
color naming pathway3. The result is that, in this example, the model generates the answer 
‘Blue’. Thus, Cohen and colleagues showed for the first time that the execution of 
cognitive control can be simulated by the implementation of processing units that actively 
maintain and communicate task instructions.  
The assumption that there exist specific neuronal assemblies (represented as task 
units in the model by Cohen and colleagues) whose activity supports goal oriented 
behavior against the influence of interfering information (i.e, in the color naming Stroop 
                                                          
3 Cohen and colleagues emphasize that, in their view, both inhibiting as well as facilitating processes 
contribute to the strengthening of the task relevant pathway. 
input units
color word
BLUE RED
output units
„Blue“ „Red“
associative units
task units color
naming
word
reading
RED
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task, word information) proved very useful in the interpretation of the prefrontal cortex’s 
(PFC) function in the context of cognitive control processes (cf. Botvinick et al., 2014). 
Indeed, historically, the PFC has been associated with cognitive control functions early 
on. For example, the Italian neurologist Leonardo Bianchi assumed as early as 1922 that 
the diffuse behavioral pathologies following partial frontal lobotomy (in dogs) have a 
common underlying cause: the inability to maintain behaviorally relevant stimulus-
response associations (Bianchi, 1922). Likewise, clinical observations made in frontal 
lobe damaged patients suggest that the PFC is immanently involved in the execution of 
cognitive control (cf. Cohen, Braver, & O’Reilly, 1996; Duncan, 1986; Milner, 1982). 
For example, Shallice and Burgess (1991) described frontal lobe damaged patients who, 
though they scored average on tests of intelligence, perception and language and were 
able to perform simple tasks (such as, for example, buy a loaf of bread), struggled and 
failed when they had to coordinate several subgoals in order to reach a superordinate goal 
(for example, coordinate a sequence of buys to complete a purchase). The authors 
assumed that the frontal lobe damage resulted in an inability to maintain intentions over 
a certain delay and thus an inability to perform actions when not triggered directly by a 
stimulus (i.e., bottom up).  
Next to these observations, also structural features of the PFC suggest its 
prominent role in cognitive control. The PFC is a collection of strongly interwoven 
neocortical regions that hosts a multitude of connections to other brain regions. The PFC 
receives input from sensory and motor cortex regions as well as subcortical regions. This 
manifests the ideal infrastructure to integrate the multimodal information that is needed 
to act goal-oriented in a complex world. Moreover, the PFC projects back to these regions, 
allowing it to exert influence on the cognitive processes represented there, i.e., allowing 
the PFC to exert cognitive control (cf. Miller, 2000). Indeed, in the 1980ies, a series of 
neurophysiological studies showed first direct evidence for the participation of frontal 
areas in cognitive control processes. More specifically, it has been found that there exist 
neurons in the PFC that showed stimulus- and reaction-specific activity that lasted until 
the required reaction was shown. It seems that these neurons maintained a sort of context 
over time to enable a task-rule-congruent reaction with temporal difference to the 
triggering stimulus (for a review, see, e.g., Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992; see also 
Cohen et al., 1996). These and numerous other studies suggest that the PFC is directly 
involved in the maintenance of mental representations, especially when these have to be 
   INTRODUCTION 15  
shielded from more habitual, automatic behavior. It thus seems reasonable to suggest that 
the PFC hosts the cell assemblies that are represented as task units in the Stroop model 
by Cohen and colleagues (1990; cf. Figure 1).  
In conclusion, today, it is common knowledge that cognitive control is executed 
through the active maintenance of goal-relevant neuronal patterns in the PFC (Miller & 
Cohen, 2001). These patterns of activity represent task or goal representations as well as 
the representation of the means to achieve these (task) goals. When activated, these 
neuronal patterns function as tuning signals for cognitive processes that are represented 
elsewhere in the brain, by that fine-tuning the organism’s behavior in such a way that the 
likelihood of goal achievement is increased (Botvinick & Cohen, 2014). In the following, 
I will give an overview on the question of how the system knows when it should execute 
cognitive control. 
 
THE SELF-REGULATION OF COGNITIVE CONTROL –  
THE CONFLICT MONITORING THEORY (CMT) 
 
 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, questions in cognitive control research began 
to alter. While in the late 20th century, questions were mainly mechanistic in nature, now, 
they shifted towards the examination of the evaluative function of cognitive control: how 
does the system determine when control execution is required? According to Botvinick, 
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen (2001), most existing theories simply assumed that 
cognitive control functions emerged whenever they were required, without specifying 
how this need for intervention should be indicated. In an attempt to overcome this 
problematic assumption of an ‘homunculus’ inside the brain that ‘just knows’ when 
cognitive control adjustments are required, Matthew Botvinick, Cameron Carter and their 
colleagues framed their influential conflict monitoring theory (CMT) (Botvinick et al., 
2001; Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Carter et al., 1998), reaching 
out to finally “disarm[ing] the homunculus” (Botvinick et al., 2014; p. 8). The authors 
built on an idea already articulated by British-Canadian psychologist and philosopher 
Daniel E. Berlyne  at the end of the 1950ies (Berlyne, 1957; 1960), proposing that 
conflicts in information processing (such as the conflict between saying ‘Blue’ or ‘Red’ 
as presented in Figure 1 above) lead to compensatory adjustments in subsequent 
information selection. Basically, this means that conflicts translate as the need for more 
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control in a given moment and that by detecting such conflicts, cognitive control self-
regulates its involvement according to current necessity.  
More specifically, Botvinick and colleagues suggested that conflicts are detected 
by the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a region in the medial surface of the frontal lobe. 
This detection is signaled to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), which 
consequently executes cognitive control by biasing subsequent information processing in 
a goal-directed manner. Implementing the CMT in the PDP Stroop model presented 
above, the conflict monitoring unit (CMU; representing the ACC) would thus, when 
conflict is detected at the response level (or at other processing stages4) in trial N signal 
the need for a control increase to the task unit layer (representing the (dl)PFC). Here, in 
turn, the task unit to ‘name the color’ would be activated5, resulting in an increased 
weighting of the color naming pathway (cf. Figure 2). In this way, the probability for a 
conflict-induced performance decrease in N+1 would be reduced by a conflict in the 
current trial N, as here, conflict detection leads to increased processing of the task-
relevant color dimension but decreased processing of the task-irrelevant word dimension.  
Indeed, Botvinick and colleagues (2001) were able to offer compelling evidence 
for the CMT in two simulation studies. In the first study, Botvinick and colleagues sorted 
diverse ACC-activating task conditions into three superordinate categories (‘tasks that 
require response override’, ‘tasks that require ‘underdetermined’ reactions’, and ‘errors’). 
The authors argue that conflict can be conceptualized as crosstalk (concurrent activation) 
between different processing pathways, so that in response override tasks, conflict is 
experienced because a predominant, but wrong reaction competes with a weaker, but 
correct reaction. In underdetermined response tasks, conflict occurs because of the 
presentation of a stimulus that activates several equally correct reactions (e.g., in a verb 
generation task). And finally, ACC activation in error commission is explained as caused 
by conflict between the incorrect but already executed response and the correct response 
that comes to mind only shortly after error commission6.   
                                                          
4 Botvinick and colleagues (2001) emphasize that conflicts can occur at any information processing stage, 
for example at the stage of stimulus evaluation, memory representation or response selection (see also 
Carter & van Veen, 2007).  
5 The question of how the cognitive system knows which task unit has to be chosen, or, more generally, how 
the cognitive system decides where control should be deployed to, has come into the focus of cognitive 
control research only recently and is a highly interesting topic in itself but goes beyond the scope of the 
present thesis (for a comprehensible review, see e.g. Botvinick & Cohen, 2014).  
6 Other authors that consider errors as an extreme form of unresolved conflict include Yeung, Botvinick, and 
Cohen (2004) and Shenhav, Botvinick, and Cohen (2013).  
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Now, Botvinick and colleagues re-used and extended well-established computer 
simulations of paradigms including these task conditions by adding a simple CMU 
(representing the ACC). The CMU estimated the activation (i.e., the amount of conflict) 
over the response layer for different task conditions in a given model; this activation was 
then compared with the respective level of ACC activation as found empirically. For 
example, in a Stroop task model (Cohen & Huston, 1994), CMU and ACC activation 
were compared for congruent and incongruent trials. Indeed, the increased ACC 
activation in incongruent as compared to congruent trials as found empirically was 
successfully mimicked by the CMU activation pattern. The same was true for a word stem 
completion model (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981) and an Eriksen flanker model 
(Servan-Schreiber, 1990; cf. Botvinick et al., 2001): in each simulation, the 
conceptualization of the ACC as a CMU confirmed neuroimaging findings of increased 
ACC activation in conditions of increased conflict levels.  
 
 
Figure 2. An illustration of a PDP model of the Stroop task that is extended by a conflict monitoring 
unit (CMU) representing the ACC (following Cohen et al., 1990; Botvinick & Cohen, 2014; 
Botvinick et al., 2001).  
 
In the second empirical part of their article, Botvinick and colleagues (2001) 
report a simulation generated to test their major hypothesis: the idea that the ACC is 
input units
color word
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„Blue“ „Red“
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critically involved in the self-regulation of cognitive control. This assumption was 
originally motivated by behavioral studies reporting online adjustments of cognitive 
control (as measured in their corresponding performance levels). For example, Botvinick 
and colleagues review a study by Gratton and colleagues (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 
1992) that reports decreased interference effects in post-conflict trials in an Eriksen 
flanker task (also called the ‘Gratton effect’). In an Eriksen flanker task, participants have 
to respond to a centrally presented target stimulus that is surrounded by irrelevant flanker 
stimuli that either are assigned to the same response as the target stimulus (a congruent 
(C) trial, benefitting performance) or not (an incongruent (I), a ‘conflict’ trial, 
deteriorating performance). The Gratton effect describes the observation of a smaller 
congruency effect following incongruent trials. More specifically, performance in 
incongruent trials following incongruent trials (II trials) is increased as compared to 
performance in incongruent trials following congruent trials (CI trials), while 
performance in congruent trials following incongruent trials (IC trials) is decreased as 
compared to performance in congruent trials following congruent trials (CC trials). This 
data pattern has been replicated often for different response tasks (e.g., Botvinick et al., 
1999; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Kerns et al., 2004; Kunde, 2003; Stürmer & Leuthold, 2003; 
Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer, 2002; Ullsperger, Bylsma, & 
Botvinick, 2005; Wühr & Ansorge, 2005). In the case of the Stroop task, the Gratton 
effect is explained by a post-conflict reduction of the influence of the irrelevant word 
pathway, while the post-conflict influence of the relevant color pathway is enhanced 
(Egner & Hirsch, 2005; see Carter & van Veen, 2007)7.  
Now, Botvinick and colleagues opted to simulate this data pattern (as well as other 
observations that can be interpreted as online adjustments of cognitive control according 
to conflict levels, i.e., the trial-type frequency effect in the Stroop task and changes in 
performance following errors) by letting the level of cognitive control vary from trial to 
trial. More specifically, the computational models in this second simulation study were 
generated in such a way that the influence of the relevant task unit should be increased if 
                                                          
7 It should be noted, however, that there is an ongoing debate in cognitive psychology whether sequential 
adaptation is an instance of cognitive control execution, as presented here, or an effect of “lower” cognitive 
processes such as episodic memory (i.e., retrieval or priming effects; see e.g. Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004; 
Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003). However, most research up to date has shown sequential modulation even 
when controlling for episodic memory effects. This suggests that conflict adaptation is produced by a 
combination of episodic and cognitive control processes. For a recent discussion of theoretical and practical 
guidelines in the investigations of sequential modulation effects see Duthoo et al. (2014) and Egner (2014). 
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the CMU detected conflict in a previous trial, or reduced if the CMU did not detect 
conflict in a previous trial8. Again, the simulations were able to replicate the behavioral 
findings elaborated above.  
In conclusion, Botvinick and colleagues (2001) offered compelling evidence for 
the validity of the CMT in two simulation studies. Nevertheless, the idea that the ACC 
functions as a CMU in the service of cognitive control regulation has not been accepted 
in all labs. In the following section, I will briefly discuss alternative interpretations of the 
function of the ACC and how these controversies have been integrated in an extended 
version of the CMT by Matthew Botvinick in 2007. It is this theory that gave the starting 
point for the studies presented in this thesis. 
 
CHALLENGING THE CMT 
 
As elaborated above, in the framework of the CMT, the ACC is conceptualized as a region 
whose major function is to detect and signal conflicts in the ongoing processing stream. 
However, while at the end of the 20th century it was widely believed that the ACC was 
involved in cognitive control somehow (D’Esposito et al., 1995; LaBerge, 1990; see also 
Botvinick et al., 2001), there was by no means a consensus on its exact role. Indeed, the 
ACC had been found to be activated in a wide variety of tasks, such as tasks involving 
perceptual target detection, motor control, language, learning, memory, imagery, dual 
task performance, and so forth (cf. Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick, 2007). Obviously, 
these tasks vary considerably, so that it was difficult to pin-point the underlying cognitive 
function that could explain the ACC activity in all of them. 
Originally, the CMT grew out of the error detection theory (EDT) of ACC 
functioning (e.g., Falkenstein et al., 1991; Falkenstein et al., 2000; cf. Carter & van Veen, 
2007). The EDT proposed that the ERN (error related negativity), a negative waveform 
that peaks 50-100 ms after executing an erroneous response or 100-150 ms after 
electromyograph onset, is generated in the ACC and represents the detection of a 
mismatch when comparing the representation of the actual (erroneous) response with the 
representation of the intended (correct) response. As can be seen from this rationale, the 
                                                          
8 More precisely, in the simulations by Botvinick and colleagues (2001), control in a given trial N was 
computed by integrating the conflict signals generated over several preceding trials. Though this probably 
represents cognitive control effects in a more naturalistic way, it is common practice in cognitive control 
research to investigate effects depending on the conflict level of the immediately preceding trial only. 
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EDT and the CMT share common grounds in their interpretation of ACC activity as a 
detection module that signals some kind of mismatch (i.e., conflict) between different 
representations. However, the CMT was soon recognized to be more general and thus 
more parsimonious; one major advantage of the CMT is that, in contrast to the EDT, it 
can explain ACC activity in correct high conflict trials, where intended and actual 
response always match, obviously (Carter & van Veen, 2007). 
Another early 21st century account of ACC functioning was the so-called 
selection-for-action theory (SFA). Here, the ACC is associated with an executive role in 
cognitive control. More specifically, Allport (1974) defined the expression selection for 
action as a mechanism that “can selectively designate a specified subset of the available, 
and potentially relevant, sensory information to have control of a given effector system, 
and can selectively decouple the remainder from such control” (p. 397). That is, in the 
framework of the SFA, the ACC is believed to select and couple specific responses with 
available sensory input (see Holroyd & Coles, 2002). In a further elaborated version of 
the SFA, Paus et al. (1993) suggested that the ACC receives executive orders from the 
dlPFC and sends them further along to motor effectors. The selection of the appropriate 
effector is supported by the mesencephalic system. This connects the SFA with a 
prominent theory of ERN functioning by Holroyd and Coles (2002). In their view, the 
ERN reflects an inhibition of mesencephalic dopamine influx into the ACC. 
Dopaminergic neurons that project into the ACC are inhibited, according to that theory, 
when a certain outcome is evaluated as being less positive than expected. By that, the 
ACC is trained over time to choose the motor controllers (that can be almost every 
structure in the brain, from the amygdala to the dlPFC) that lead to the most effective 
outcome in a given situation. Thus, also in the ERN theory by Holroyd and Coles (2002), 
the ACC is given an executive function.  
The major difference between the CMT on the one hand and the SFA (including 
the framework as put forward by Holroyd and Coles (2002)) on the other hand is that the 
CMT ascribes the ACC a monitoring function, while the latter ascribes the ACC an action 
selection function. However, there have been elegant studies that shed light on this 
controversy. Botvinick and colleagues (1999) directly tested predictions of the SFA 
against predictions of the CMT in a fMRI study using an Eriksen Flanker paradigm. They 
made use of the fact that selection-for-action and response conflict are inversely 
correlated in trials following congruent versus trials following incongruent trials, an effect 
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that is especially obvious for currently incongruent trials. In iI trials, distracting influence 
of incongruent flankers is minimal, that is, in these trials, SFA (i.e., the engagement of 
mechanisms that couple the target stimulus with a specific response) should be high while 
response conflict should be low. In cI trials, in contrast, distracting influence of 
incongruent flankers is high, that is, in these trials, SFA should be low while response 
conflict should be high. Analysis of the imaging data revealed that ACC activity was 
higher for cI than for iI trials, suggesting that the ACC is responsible for the monitoring 
of response conflicts rather than the execution of cognitive control.  
A second imaging study yielding results in support of the CMT was conducted by 
Carter and colleagues (2000). In that study, participants engaged in a verbal version of 
the Stroop task and ran through blocks with high and low frequencies of conflict trials. 
Similar to the study by Botvinick and colleagues (1999), Carter et al. presumed that the 
activity level of the ACC in high versus low conflict blocks should be predictive of the 
ACC’s role in cognitive control processes. Carter et al. assumed that blocks with high 
conflict frequencies would generate high expectancies for conflict stimuli in participants, 
while blocks with low conflict frequencies would generate low expectancies for conflict 
stimuli. Now, if participants have high conflict expectancy (in blocks with high conflict 
frequency), they should increase executive action selection processes (SFA) in order to 
be prepared for conflict experience. By that, actual conflict experience would be 
diminished in these blocks. On the other hand, if participants have low conflict 
expectancy (in blocks with low conflict frequency), they should diminish engagement in 
action selection processes (SFA) because preparation would not be too necessary but 
would experience high conflict levels when confronted with a conflict stimulus. Thus, 
high ACC activity in frequent-conflict blocks should support the SFA, while high ACC 
activity in infrequent-conflict blocks would support the CMT. Again, the results of this 
second fMRI study speak for the CMT.  
While the evidence favouring the CMT over the SFA accrued over time9, another 
major challenge for the CMT arose from a study that was conducted in 2002 by Gehring 
and Willoughby (see also Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd, Schurger, & Cohen, 2004). In 
this EEG study, participants had to engage in a gambling task, that is, they had to choose 
                                                          
9 As a sidenote, another observation that supports a monitoring as opposed to an executive function of the 
ACC is the fact that ACC activity is high on erroneous trials where selection-for-action should be virtually 
absent (cf. Botvinick et al., 2001). 
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between two rectangles which were associated with different monetary gains or losses. 
After choosing, participants received feedback that informed them on the amount of 
money they had won or lost. Moreover, this performance feedback showed participants 
if they had won or lost more or less money if they had chosen the alternative option. In 
that way, the authors were able to disentangle influence of actual error feedback from 
influence of loss feedback; most of the times, these conditions are confounded in standard 
laboratory tasks. What they found is that the medio-frontal negativity (MFN), a negative 
deflection often interpreted as representing the same neuronal activity inside the ACC 
that is otherwise known as the ERN, was more strongly correlated with the loss feedback 
than the error feedback per se. Thus, Gehring and Willoughby (2002) suggested that what 
the ACC actually monitors for is not the instance of an error but the motivational impact 
an error entails. More general, this and other studies (Bush et al., 2002; Holroyd & Coles, 
2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004) can be subsumed as favouring an outcome evaluation 
account (OEA) of ACC functioning, proposing that the ACC reacts particularly strong to 
instances of aversive action outcomes. This view is further supported by studies showing 
ACC engagement in conditions of negative feedback (Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997), 
monetary loss (Blair et al., 2006; Kahnt et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2011), self-experienced 
pain (Rainville, 2002), the mere observation of pain in others (Singer et al., 2004; Lamm, 
Decety, & Singer, 2011) and social rejection (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; 
Kawamoto et al., 2012).  
While these results cannot be explained by the original conceptualization of the 
CMT, Botvinick et al. addressed some of these contradictions already in 200110. They 
acknowledged that conflict monitoring might only be one of several functions the ACC 
holds, but also proposed the possibility to interpret these aversive outcomes as sharing its 
purpose with the purpose of conflict detection: to inform the system of the need to 
reallocate control resources, that something is off track11. In 2007, Botvinick built on that 
original thought and suggested an integrative view of the OEA and CMT. He reviewed 
                                                          
10 Majorly, Botvinick et al. (2001) referred to the finding of enhanced ACC activity in the Miltner et al. (1997) 
study, but also mention work by Hsieh et al. (1994) and Jones et al. (1991) that showed ACC activation in 
response to pain and itch. Here, Botvinick and colleagues cleverly argue that pain- and itch-induced ACC 
activity might as well represent conflict between the automatic urge to ease the pain such as by scratching 
and the instructed behaviour of sitting still / engage in the task while participating in the experiment. 
11 Botvinick et al. (2001) mention that there still exists an important conceptual difference between conflicts 
in information processing and aversive outcomes in general. While aversive outcomes such as pain, 
negative feedback and social exclusion inform the system that something has gone wrong, conflicts inform 
the system that something might go wrong. 
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existing literature of both sides and concluded that first, the ACC seems to get engaged 
whenever an outcome is aversive, and that second, the detection of such aversive events 
seems to drive a form of avoidance learning, which is however executed in other parts of 
the brain. This interpretation of data fits with more detailed versions of the OEA as put 
forward in some work (see e.g., Bush et al., 2002; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd 
& Coles, 2002), stating that the overall function of the ACC’s sensitivity to aversive 
outcomes is to guide decision making so as to optimize performance outcomes. Most 
importantly, it also fits with the CMT, as it conceptualizes the conflict experience as a 
form of negative reinforcer that punishes sloppy cognitive control.   
To conclude, in 2007, Botvinick integrated two influential theories of ACC 
functioning into one comprehensible account. According to that, the ACC registers any 
form of aversive event in an organism’s environment, signalling the need to adapt 
behavioural strategies in a way that minimizes future costs. Thus, what Botvinick’s work 
implies is that conflicts in information processing are experienced as aversive, too. This 
is an assumption that, although crucial for the validation of the extended version of the 
CMT, had not been tested until 2012, as will be further elaborated in the following.  
 
CONFLICTS AS AVERSIVE SIGNALS 
 
Although the suggestion that conflicts are inherently aversive is of major importance to 
the validity of the extended version of the CMT as presented by Matthew Botvinick 
(2007), it has long been untested. In 2012, however, Dreisbach and Fischer for the first 
time directly demonstrated conflict aversiveness (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a). To that 
aim, the authors modified an acknowledged version of the original affective priming 
paradigm by Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes (1986; see also Fazio, 2001). In 
standard versions of the affective priming tasks, participants have to react to target stimuli 
(usually words or pictures) after being primed by positive or negative primes (usually 
words or pictures). The typical finding is that performance is increased if prime and target 
share the same valence. The most common explanation is that priming with an affective 
stimulus pre-activates an affect-congruent network, thus lowering the threshold for 
reactions to same-valence target stimuli. Now, in two experiments, Dreisbach and Fischer 
used Stroop conflict and non-conflict stimuli as primes and positive and negative words 
and pictures as targets. The idea was that if Stroop conflicts are aversive, then they should 
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yield the same data pattern that is found when priming participants with other aversive 
primes. Indeed, this is what was found: being primed with Stroop conflicts, participants 
reacted faster and less error-prone to negative target stimuli as compared to positive target 
stimuli. This study was the starting point for the present thesis - I will now give a short 
overview on the aims and hypotheses of the three peer-reviewed articles that are presented 
in the next part of this thesis.  
STUDY 1 aimed at de-confounding the results of Dreisbach and Fischer (2012a) 
from a possible effect of processing fluency. Dreisbach and Fischer made use of target 
stimuli with affective valence. That is, being primed by conflict or non-conflict Stroop 
stimuli, participants had to categorize positive or negative target stimuli according to 
valence. This, however, may have induced a confound that renders the interpretation of 
results difficult. Using affective target stimuli rendered the possibility that observed 
‘affective priming effects’ are actually caused by an overlap of processing fluency 
characteristics between conflict prime and negative target and non-conflict prime and 
positive target stimulus, on the other hand.  Thus, the effect as reported by Dreisbach and 
Fischer may not reflect an instance of conflict priming, but may instead reflect an effect 
of primed processing fluency. Thus, the aim of this thesis’ first study was to de-confound 
the conflict priming effect from aspects of processing fluency and thus to offer more 
unequivocal evidence for the aversiveness of conflicts in information processing. To this 
end, two experiments were conducted that included neutral target stimuli (Experiment 
1A: neutral German words; Experiment 1B: Chinese pictographs). The reproduction of 
the conflict priming effect with these new dependent variables was expected. 
STUDY 2 of this thesis was designed to examine the time course of Stroop 
conflicts’ aversiveness. While typically, affective priming effects can only be found with 
short prime presentation times, the time course of the affective valence induced by 
conflicts in information processing may substantially differ from that. To this end, three 
experiments were conducted to examine the time characteristics of the conflict priming 
effect in more detail (Experiments 2A, 2B and 2C). Prime presentation duration as well 
as stimulus onset asynchronity (SOA) was varied systematically. It was expected that the 
affective valence produced by conflict primes is similar in nature to other affective 
stimuli, such that the conflict priming effect would be most obvious with short prime 
presentation times.  
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STUDY 3, finally, aimed at exploring the function of conflict aversiveness: is 
conflict aversiveness a necessary precondition for conflict adaptation to occur? To this 
aim, two experiments were conducted in which the aversiveness of conflict stimuli was 
manipulated by adding additional aversiveness (in the form of perceptual disfluency) on 
some trials (Experiments 3A and 3B). We reasoned that if it is aversiveness that triggers 
conflict adaptation, then increasing the aversiveness of a conflict stimulus should result 
in increased conflict adaption effects.   
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ABSTRACT 
 
Botvinick (2007) recently suggested that competing theories of  the monitoring function 
of anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) for cognitive control might converge on the detection 
of aversive signals in general, implying that response conflicts, a known trigger of ACC 
activation, are aversive, too. Recent evidence showing conflict priming (i.e., faster 
responses to negative targets after conflict primes) directly supports this notion but 
remains inconclusive with regard to possible confounds with processing fluency. To this 
end, two experiments were conducted to offer more compelling evidence for the negative 
valence of conflicts. Participants were primed by (conflict and non-conflict) Stroop 
stimuli and subsequently had to judge the valence of neutral German words (Experiment 
1A) or Chinese pictographs (Experiment 1B). Results show that conflict, as compared 
with non-conflict, primes led to more negative judgments of subsequently presented 
neutral target stimuli. The findings will be discussed in the light of existing theories of 
action control highlighting the role of aversive signals for sequential processing 
adjustments.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Cognitive control describes the human ability to flexibly adapt goals and actions in 
accordance with internal and external needs (Miller & Cohen, 2001). One of the main 
mechanisms underlying such cognitive flexibility is a monitoring function that supervises 
the ongoing processing stream for significant information, like for example error 
feedback or co-activation of conflicting response tendencies. Once, an error or conflict 
signal is detected, cognitive control is increased in order to solve the conflict or increase 
accuracy, respectively (e.g. Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Holroyd & 
Cole, 2002; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). From brain imaging studies, there exists 
broad empirical evidence that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) plays a major role in 
this monitoring process. For example, Botvinick and colleagues (2001), in their 
influential conflict monitoring theory, suggest that the ACC is activated by response 
conflicts and then signals the need for additional control to the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000; Kerns, Cohen, MacDonald, Cho, 
Stenger, & Carter, 2004). Behaviorally, this sequential control adaptation is reflected in 
a reduced response conflict in trial N after a response conflict in trial N-1 (Botvinick, 
Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Gratton, Coles & Donchin, 1992; Notebaert, 
Soetens, & Melis, 2001; Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer, 2002; Wühr 
& Ansorge, 2005; for a review see Egner, 2007). However, this ACC model of conflict 
adaptation was recently challenged by several studies showing that the ACC is not only 
activated by response conflicts but also by social rejection/exclusion (Eisenberger, 
Lieberman, & Williams, 2003), monetary losses (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd, 
Schurger, & Cohen, 2004), and experienced and witnessed pain (Rainville, 2002; Singer 
et al., 2004; for a review see Shackman, Salomons, Slagter, Fox, Winter, & Davidson, 
2011). Therefore, Botvinick (2007) presented an integrative account of ACC function, 
suggesting that ACC might monitor and detect just any aversive signal in the ongoing 
processing stream. The significance of this assumption should not be underestimated as 
it would make the ACC monitoring theory applicable to a much wider range of tasks and 
situations. However, since most of the evidence in favor of the monitoring theory of ACC 
function stems from response conflict paradigms, it is essential to show that response 
conflicts themselves actually serve as an aversive signal.   
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The notion of conflict as an aversive signal so far has mostly been supported by 
indirect evidence. Using an Eriksen Flanker paradigm, van Steenbergen, Band and 
Hommel (2009) provided first indirect evidence for the aversive nature of conflicts. They 
showed that reward stimuli randomly (and unconditional of the actual performance) 
following conflict trials eliminated conflict adaptation effects. This was taken as evidence 
that the positive affect induced by the reward signal counteracted the negative valence of 
the conflict, thereby eliminating the signal for control adjustments (but see Braem, 
Verguts, Roggeman, & Notebaert (2012), who found enhanced conflict adaptation 
following action contingent reward). Furthermore, Dreisbach and Fischer (2011) 
provided support that the negative valence of conflicts and not the response conflict itself, 
triggers sequential processing adjustments. In a magnitude comparison task with no 
response conflict involved, participants had to decide whether a presented number word 
was smaller or larger than five. The number words were either written in an easy-to-read 
(fluent), or a hard-to-read (non-fluent) font. It is well-documented that stimuli that are 
processed fluently induce positive affect, whereas stimuli that are processed non-fluently 
induce negative affect (e.g., Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004; Winkielman & 
Cacioppo, 2001). Importantly, the results presented by Dreisbach and Fischer (2011) 
show that non-fluent and thus aversive number words induced sequential processing 
adjustments resembling conflict adaptation effects: the fluency effect (faster responses 
for fluent than for non-fluent trials) was smaller following non-fluent trials than following 
fluent trials. This was taken as evidence, that even in the absence of conflict, cognitive 
effort increased after non-fluent stimuli. Combining literature that highlights aversiveness 
of non-fluent stimuli with the observation that they induce conflict-like sequential 
adaptation effects, it can thus be reasoned that it is the aversiveness inherited in both types 
of stimuli that triggers the control adjustments. Further evidence for the aversiveness of 
conflict comes from Schouppe, De Houwer, Ridderinkhof and Notebaert (2012) who 
recently showed that Stroop conflict stimuli promote avoidance behavior. The probably 
most direct approach to study the affective valence of conflicts was taken by Dreisbach 
and Fischer (2012a), who administered a conflict priming task, inspired by the affective 
priming paradigm first introduced by Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes (1986).  
In a typical affective priming paradigm, participants encounter a prime stimulus of certain 
valence (e.g., a positive or negative picture), followed by a target stimulus of certain 
valence (e.g., a positive or negative word), with the instruction to evaluate the valence of 
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the target stimulus as fast and accurately as possible. The typical finding is that positive 
primes facilitate responses to positive targets, whereas negative primes facilitate 
responses to negative targets. Now, Dreisbach and Fischer (2012a) used congruent and 
incongruent Stroop color words as (presumably) affective primes, and positive and 
negative words/pictures as targets. As predicted, they found faster reaction times (RTs) 
for negative targets following incongruent Stroop primes and slower RTs following 
congruent Stroop primes. This was taken as first direct evidence for the negative valence 
of conflicts. However, and alternatively, the results might also be interpreted in terms of 
a match of processing fluency between prime and target, as will be further outlined below. 
Therefore, the aim of the study presented here was to provide more unequivocal evidence 
for the aversive nature of conflicts.   
Affective priming effects are commonly referred to as effects of valence 
compatibility (Fazio et al., 1986; Fazio, 2001): Responses are slow whenever the valence 
of prime and target  are incompatible, and fast whenever both valences are compatible. 
However, it is conceivable that conflict primes and negative targets in the study by 
Dreisbach and Fischer (2012a) matched in more than just the valence dimension. The 
numerous variants of priming paradigms suggest that the possibilities for an overlap in 
dimensions and thus compatibility effects  between prime and target stimuli are abundant 
(see Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990). For instance, prime and target can overlap 
semantically, such as dog priming cat instead of sun, or orthographically, such as house 
priming mouse instead of rose (for a review, see Gulan & Valerjev, 2010). Importantly, 
findings by Chang and Mitchell (2009) suggest that results in compatibility-dependent 
tasks with more than one dimensional overlap between prime and target can be 
confounded with unnoticed prime-target relations. More specifically, the authors report 
that findings in the implicit association task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998), an associative task closely related to affective priming paradigms, can be 
confounded with artifacts due to underlying compatibility in terms of processing fluency. 
Perhaps, then, faster responses in non-conflict prime/positive target and conflict 
prime/negative target combinations (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a) were not the result of 
valence associations, but were caused by matching processing characteristics: in 
particular, positive targets and non-conflict primes might be processed more easily, and 
negative targets and conflict primes might be processed less easily (see Unkelbach, 
Fiedler, Bayer, Stegmüller, & Danner, 2008; Scott, O’Donnell, Leuthold, & Sereno, 
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2009). One theoretical account, the so-called ‘density hypothesis’, proposes that the speed 
advantage in the processing of positive information as compared to negative information 
is caused by the higher density of positive information in memory (i.e., positive concepts 
such as “happy” and “content” are more similar than negative concepts such as “angry” 
and “sad”, for example; Unkelbach et al., 2008). Because of this alleged density, 
processing of a positive stimulus (in comparison to processing of a negative stimulus) 
immediately triggers an entire network of equally valenced information. This fast and 
wide-spread activation manifests in higher processing fluency for positive information, 
whereas the processing of negative information triggers a rather uncompressed network, 
manifesting in lower processing fluency for negative information. Applied to the conflict 
paradigm used previously, this means that priming effects between non-fluently 
processed negative targets and non-fluently processed incongruent Stroop stimuli (as 
compared to congruent Stroop stimuli) might rest on similar processing characteristics 
instead of valence congruency. That is, even though affect and processing fluency may 
represent two sides of the same coin (Reber et al., 2004; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001), 
it cannot be ruled out that the priming effects observed by Dreisbach and Fischer (2012a) 
were mainly mediated by an overlap in processing fluency between conflict prime and 
target.  To this end, in the experiments presented here we again administered a conflict 
priming task but this time only used neutral targets to de-confound possible fluency 
characteristics from target valence. Participants’ task this time was to spontaneously 
judge the affective valence of the neutral target stimuli. The rationale is that conflict 
primes should modulate the affective judgment according to the prime’s valence (e.g. 
Murphy, Monahan, & Zajonc, 1995; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). Whereas 
reaction times (RT) to categorize affective target stimuli according to their valence served 
as dependent measure in the conflict priming paradigm used by Dreisbach and Fischer 
(2012a), we now measured valence judgments of affectively neutral target stimuli (that 
is, German words in Experiment 1A and neutral Chinese characters in Experiment 1B) 
following congruent and incongruent Stroop primes. That is, neutral target stimuli 
ensured equivalent processing fluency of targets and thus ruled out the possibility of 
fluency compatibility confounds. If conflicts are truly aversive in nature, then their 
negative valence should spread to the otherwise neutral targets when presented shortly 
after them. We thus expected to find more negative judgments after conflict primes as 
compared to non-conflict primes.  
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EXPERIMENTS 1A AND 1B 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
In Experiment 1A, 21 right-handed students (13 female, eight male; mean age 25.6 years, 
SD = 5.2), and in Experiment 1B, a separate sample of 24 right-handed students (19 
female, five male; mean age 22.2 years, SD = 1.8) from the University of Regensburg, 
participated in exchange of a chocolate bar or 2 Euros. All 45 participants signed informed 
consent and were debriefed after the session. The data of one participant who showed a 
strong trend towards positive judgment (more than 75% of target words were evaluated 
as positive (1A), one participant who was color blind (1B) and one participant who 
misunderstood instructions (1B), were excluded from analysis, leaving final samples of 
20 (1A) and 22 (1B), respectively. 
 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
Primes were the German color words for BLUE, GREEN, YELLOW, RED, and PURPLE 
printed in blue, green, yellow, red, and purple. The print color could either match (non-
conflict stimuli) or mismatch (conflict stimuli) the color denoted by the word. Primes and 
target words were written in Courier New bold, 26pt, each letter subtending a visual angle 
of approximately 0.7° X 0.7° at a viewing distance of 55 cm. In Experiment 1a, targets 
were 112 German words (94 nouns, 12 verbs, and 6 adjectives selected on the basis of 
neutral affective ratings from the Berlin affective word-list reloaded BAWL-R (mean 
valence ratings: -.001, running on a scale from from 3 (very negative) through 0 (neutral 
) to 3 (very positive), SD = .000; range of ratings: .109; Võ et al., 2009). In Experiment 
1b, targets were 144 Chinese pictographs which subtended a visual angle of 
approximately 8° X 8° and were chosen randomly from an online English - Chinese 
dictionary12 (cf. Murphy, Monahan, & Zajonc, 1995; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Zajonc, 
1968). The pictographs represented nouns, such as ‘wall’, verbs, such as ‘to go’ and 
adjectives, such as ‘new’. Primes and targets appeared at the center of the screen on a 
light grey background.  
                                                          
12 Online English-Chinese dictionary available at http://www.mdbg.net/chindict/chindict.php 
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Procedure 
Participants had to judge the valence of targets (i.e., German words (1A) or Chinese 
characters (1B)) that were preceded by Stroop primes. They had to press a right response 
key to judge the target as positive and a left response key to judge the target as negative 
(“-“ and “y”-key on a QWERTZ keyboard, respectively). This assignment was held 
constant as people have a natural tendency to associate positive concepts with their 
dominant body side, i.e. the right hand (Casasanto, 2009). Participants were asked to 
choose each option at approximately the same rate to minimize potential biases in favor 
of one response key. To ensure processing of the primes, catch trials were interspersed: 
whenever the prime word was the German word for PURPLE or the primes BLUE, 
GREEN, YELLOW, or RED were printed in purple, participants had to press the space 
bar instead of evaluating the following target. As both color and word dimension could 
denote a potential catch trial, proper encoding of Stroop primes and thus the experience 
of conflict should be warranted.  
Each trial started with the presentation of the Stroop prime for 400 ms, as 
electrophysiological studies show a peak in conflict-associated negativity at around 400 
ms after Stroop stimulus onset (Hanslmayr et al., 2008; Liotti, Woldorff, Perez, & 
Mayberg, 2000). After the prime, the target appeared and remained on screen until a 
response was given. Inter-trial-intervals were of 1000 ms length. In erroneous catch-trials, 
the German word for ERROR appeared on screen.  
After a short test to exclude color blindness, the conflict priming task started with 
two short practice blocks to familiarize participants with the task.13 Experiment 1A 
consisted of two experimental blocks of 112 trials, separated by a self-paced break. In a 
given block, each target word was presented once. More precisely, 48 words were 
preceded by a congruent prime, 48 by an incongruent prime and 16 by a catch prime in a 
given block. Prime congruency was thus manipulated trial-wise and random. Moreover, 
target words that were preceded by a conflict prime in one block were preceded by a non-
conflict prime in the second block (order counterbalanced across participants).  
                                                          
13 In Experiment 1A, as in the previous study by Dreisbach and Fischer (2012) the experiment started with 
a short block of 24 Stroop stimuli, where participants had to name the color of the words to make participants 
familiar with the (aversive character) of the Stroop primes. However, because the error rate for catch trials 
in Experiment 1A was very low, the short Stroop block was dropped in Experiment 1B, since catch trials 
successfully ensured the processing of the Stroop primes. 
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Experiment 1B using 144 different Chinese characters consisted of only one experimental 
block of 144 trials length, composed of 120 target trials intermixed with 24 catch trials. 
60 targets were thus preceded by a congruent prime, 60 targets by an incongruent prime 
and 24 by a catch prime. Again, the combination of prime congruence and target was 
random and varied between participants. In both experiments, there was a minimum 
distance of two and a maximum distance of 8 target trials between catch trials. Experiment 
1A lasted about 15 minutes, Experiment 1B about 8 minutes. 
 
Results 
 
Mean error rate in catch trials was low in both experiments (1A: M = 4.08%, SD = 3.68; 
1B: 4.91%, SD = 7.41), suggesting participants encoded both word and color dimension 
properly. For each experiment, proportions of negative/positive judgments as a function 
of prime (conflict/non-conflict) of the experimental blocks were computed. To test for a 
general bias in judgment, we conducted two one-sampled t-tests (two-sided) against the 
null hypothesis of 50%. In both experiments, judgment was unbiased (1A: frequency of 
positive judgments: M = 52.37%, SD = 8.56, t(19) =  1.239, p = .231, d = .281; 1B: M = 
48.58%, SD = 8.13, t(21) < 1, p = .423, d = .183).14  
To test for affective priming effects by conflict primes, we compared mean 
frequencies of negatively judged targets depending on prime condition. In both 
experiments, paired t-tests (one-sided) revealed a significant difference between prime 
conditions (1A: t(19) = 2.125, p = .024, d = 0.475; 1B: t(21) = 2.256, p = .018, d = 0.481). 
Neutral target stimuli were judged more frequently as negative after conflict than after 
non-conflict primes (1A: M = 48.54%, SD = 9.30, vs. M = 46.32%, SD = 8.95; 1B: M = 
53.52%, SD = 9.35, vs. M = 49.31%, SD = 9.11, see Figure 3).  
 
 
                                                          
14 For the sake of completeness, mean reaction times (RT) for each prime-target combination were entered 
into a 2 (prime congruence: conflict/non-conflict) X 2 (judgment: positive/negative) ANOVA with repeated 
measures. No main effect or interaction reached significance (all F < 2.3, all p > 1.3). For mean RTs see 
Table 1, Appendix. 
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Figure 3. Frequencies (%) of negative judgments of neutral targets as a function of prime 
condition (non-conflict, conflict) in Experiments 1A and 1B. Bars represent standard errors of the 
mean.   
 
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The results presented here clearly support the notion of conflicts as aversive signals as 
implied by the integrative account of ACC function recently suggested by Botvinick 
(2007). The negative valence of conflicts, just as the negative affect induced by frowning 
faces (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) or negative pictures (Payne et al., 1995), spreads to 
neutral target stimuli which are then evaluated accordingly: Neutral German words 
(Experiment 1A) and Chinese pictographs (Experiment 1B) were more often judged as 
negative after conflict as compared to non-conflict primes. Whereas findings of conflict 
priming in paradigms relying on prime-target-compatibility (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a) 
were ambiguous with regard to their origin (i.e., match vs. mismatch of either valence or 
processing fluency between prime and target), the two experiments presented here 
provide unequivocal evidence for the aversive nature of conflicts.  
However, and for the sake of completeness, it should be noted that there exist at 
least two studies that were not able to find any evidence in favor of the affective valence 
of conflict stimuli. Schacht and colleagues (Schacht, Nigbur, & Sommer, 2009; Schacht, 
Dimigen, & Sommer, 2010) registered physiological markers of arousal and emotion in 
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a go/no-go paradigm and found reduced startle blink and skin conductance responses in 
(conflict) no-go trials as compared to (non-conflict) go trials denoting - if anything - rather 
reduced arousal and less negative valence for no-go trials. However, go and no-go trials 
not only differ with respect to their (presumed) affective valence but obviously so also 
with respect to other processing characteristics (like motor affordances). In contrast, 
Renaud and Blondin (1997) let participants perform a variation of the Stroop task with 
equal motor affordances for high and low conflict stimuli while recording their heart rates. 
More precisely, conflict was manipulated block-wise: Participants performed blocks of 
either only incongruent or only neutral (colored XXX) trials. The authors found increased 
heart rates in the conflict (incongruent stimuli) as compared to non-conflict (neutral 
stimuli) blocks. In the same line, Kobayashi, Yoshino, Takahashi, and Nomura (2007) 
report enhanced skin conductance responses (SCRs) associated with incongruent trials in 
a Stroop task. Taken together, the findings of Renaud and Blondin (1997), and Kobayashi 
et al. (2007) can be taken as evidence for the increased effort associated with conflict 
stimuli. Higher effort, in turn, is considered to be experienced as aversive (Song & 
Schwarz, 2008). This is also in line with Hajcak, McDonald, and Simons (2004) who 
report an association of enhanced heart rate and SCRs with negative affect in response to 
error conduction. In sum, there is now physiological as well as psychological evidence 
for the aversive nature of conflicts. 
One limitation of the present study rests on the working principle of the affective 
priming paradigm. In this paradigm, participants do not have to react overtly to the 
primes. As we used conflict and non-conflict Stroop primes as affective primes in our 
study, this raises the question if passive viewing of conflict primes indeed induced 
(response) conflict in the present paradigm. In fact, in the original conflict model as 
proposed by Botvinick and colleagues, conflict was measured over the response (i.e. 
output) layer (Botvinick et al., 2001), suggesting that response conflict is actually a 
mandatory precondition for control adjustments to occur. However, the authors also 
admitted that in principle, such conflict could occur at any other representational level. 
More precisely, they state that conflict might be triggered by any ‘‘simultaneous 
activation of incompatible representations’’ (p. 680). Furthermore, van Veen et al. (2004) 
point out that conflict monitoring has repeatedly been found not to be restricted to the 
response level. For example, there is evidence for ACC activation for response as well as 
perceptual and semantic conflict in a global/local task (Weissman, Giesbrecht, Song, 
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Mangun, & Woldorff, 2003) and in the non-response condition of a Stroop task (Milham, 
Banich, & Barad, 2003). And finally, in our study, it can be assumed that at least 
preparatory motor processes were present in both experiments. Note that participants had 
to monitor for events that required motor reactions to Stroop primes (i.e., catch trials). 
These events were denoted by both the word and color dimension of the primes, that is, 
together with the finding of a very low number of catch trial omissions, it is very likely 
that the Stroop primes not only induced stimulus but probably also response conflict. As 
a side note, the functional boundaries of response and stimulus conflict are still not drawn 
clearly in the literature – Notebaert and Verguts (2006), for example, found enhanced 
conflict adaptation effects for stimulus conflict but not for response conflict. 
The notion of the ACC as a detector of both cognitive as well as affective conflict 
has been proposed earlier (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). Interestingly, while Bush et al. 
(2000) ascribed the cognitive and affective monitoring functions to separate regions of 
the ACC (dorsal and ventral ACC, respectively), Shackman et al. (2011) argued against 
this segregated view of ACC function in a recent review. Indeed, the authors presented 
strong evidence for conjoint anterior midcingulate cortex (mACC) activation by cognitive 
control, negative affect and pain. This fits perfectly with the idea that this region of the 
ACC serves the function of an aversive signal detector, as suggested by Botvinick (2007), 
whose integrative account of ACC function was the starting point for our investigation. 
The author proposed that two long-standing theories of ACC function, namely the conflict 
monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001) and the outcome evaluation account (Holroyd 
& Coles, 2002), might converge on the detection of aversive signals in general. The 
present results strongly support the notion of the ACC as a detector and indicator of 
aversive signals. However, given that our conclusions are based entirely on behavioral 
data, it will be vital to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying conflict priming 
effect in future studies.  More precisely, a consequential assumption that could be tested 
using functional MRI is, whether and how valence judgments of targets actually covary 
with the strength of prime-induced ACC activation. Furthermore, assuming that the ACC 
only detects the aversive signal conveyed by a conflict, future studies should elucidate 
the role of brain regions other than the ACC that are involved in the further processing 
and generation of the negative judgments after the (aversive) conflict is detected. For 
instance, it is conceivable that functional connectivity between ACC and affect-related 
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regions (e.g., amygdala, striatum or ventromedial prefrontal cortex) varies as a function 
of conflict priming. 
To conclude, the results of the conflict priming paradigm presented here, together 
with previous more or less direct evidence, show that conflict indeed is registered as an 
aversive signal (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a; Schouppe et al., 2012; van Steenbergen et 
al., 2009; 2010).  Given the further evidence that aversive stimuli have been shown to 
induce sequential processing adjustments even in the absence of any response conflict 
(Dreisbach & Fischer, 2011), it can be assumed that the conflict monitoring theory might 
actually be applicable to any aversive signal in the ongoing processing stream. Our results 
thus add to the growing literature showing that affective signals play an important role in 
sequential action control (see Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012b, for a review). 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Table 1. Mean RTs for target judgments in Experiment 1A and 1B as a function of judgment 
(negative, positive) and prime congruency (conflict, non-conflict; standard deviations in 
parentheses). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stroop-Primes 
 
 
 
Conflict 
 
Non-Conflict 
 
Total 
Judgment 
 
1A 1B 
 
1A 1B 
 
1A 1B 
Negative 
 
914.3 
(306) 
796.8 
(175.2) 
 
912.8 
(287.6) 
798.3 
(190.1) 
 
913.5 
(295.9) 
797.6 
(178.9) 
Positive 
 
897.7 
(294.2) 
783.7 
(179.1) 
 
898.8 
(294.2) 
771.9 
(148.7) 
 
898.2 
(285.9) 
777.8 
(161.3) 
          
Total 
 
905.8 
(282.0) 
790.2 
(173.5) 
 
906.0 
(297.1) 
785.1 
(165.3) 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The idea that conflicts are aversive signals recently has gained strong support by both 
physiological as well as psychological evidence. However, the time course of the aversive 
signal has not been subject to direct investigation. In the present study, participants had 
to judge the valence of neutral German words after being primed with conflict or non-
conflict Stroop stimuli in three experiments with varying SOA (200 ms, 400 ms, 800 ms) 
and varying prime presentation time. Conflict priming effects (i.e., increased frequencies 
of negative judgments after conflict as compared to non-conflict primes) were found for 
SOAs of 200 ms and 400 ms, but absent (or even reversed) with a SOA of 800 ms. These 
results imply that the aversiveness of conflicts is evaluated automatically with short 
SOAs, but is actively counteracted with prolonged prime presentation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Cognitive control is needed in situations in which automatic, well-learned responses have 
to be suppressed in favor of controlled, less habitual responses (Miller & Cohen, 2001). 
In everyday life, such a situation occurs for example when you are visiting a country with 
left-hand drive but are used right-hand traffic from your home country. When crossing a 
street in Bali, for example, a German tourist would have to suppress the habitual action 
of looking left  before starting to walk, but instead should look right. In the laboratory, 
cognitive control is mostly studied using paradigms involving conflicting response 
tendencies, as conflict is a known trigger for cognitive control processes (Botvinick, 
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001).  
A prominent conflict task is the Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 1935). Here, 
participants have to name the ink color of a color word presented in a certain color, that 
is, they have to suppress the automatic, highly-learned action of reading the depicted word 
in favor of the controlled action of naming its color. Conflict arises whenever word 
meaning and word color are incongruent (such as RED printed in blue, for example) as 
opposed to when they are congruent (such as RED printed in red, for example). Recent 
theoretical accounts (Botvinick, 2007) as well as physiological (Renauld & Blondin, 
1997; Kobayashi, Yoshino, Takahashi, & Nomura, 2007; van Bochove, van der Haegen, 
Notebaert, & Verguts, 2013; van Steenbergen & Band, 2013) and psychological findings 
(Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a; Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013; Schouppe et al., 2012; van 
Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009; 2012) suggest that such conflicts are experienced 
as aversive and that this aversiveness is related to subsequent behavioral adaptations 
(Botvinick, 2007; for a review, see Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012b). These findings highlight 
the important role of affect in allegedly “cold” cognition and in action control in general 
(see Shackman et al., 2011).  
In two recent studies (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a; Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013), we 
demonstrated the aversive nature of conflicts by using variants of the affective priming 
paradigm that was originally introduced by Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes 
(1986; see also Fazio, 2001) and is used to measure the affective valence of attitude 
objects. In the original affective priming paradigm, an attitude object (word or picture) is 
presented as prime stimulus and immediately followed by a positively or negatively 
valenced target stimulus. Participants’ task is to categorize the valence of the target 
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stimulus as fast and accurate as possible. The typical finding is that a prime that is 
automatically evaluated as positive eases the evaluation of positive targets and impairs 
the evaluation of negative targets and vice versa. That is, the affective priming effect is 
commonly interpreted in terms of automatic attitude activation by the prime, which then 
facilitates processing of affect-congruent information and impairs processing of affect-
incongruent information (Fazio et al., 1986; Fazio, 2001; Hermans, Spruyt, & Eeelen, 
2003). Using conflict and non-conflict Stroop stimuli as affective primes, Dreisbach and 
Fischer (2012) showed that Stroop conflict primes, as compared to Stroop non-conflict 
primes, lead to faster categorization of negative target words and pictures, thereby 
providing first direct evidence for the aversiveness of conflict stimuli.  
In order to exclude possible confounds by processing fluency we recently chose a 
slightly different variant of the affective priming paradigm (for a detailed discussion see 
Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013). There, we let participants judge the valence of neutral German 
words (Experiment 1A) and Chinese pictographs (Experiment 1B) that were always 
preceded by conflict or non-conflict Stroop stimuli. In both experiments, we consistently 
found that Stroop conflict primes (as compared to Stroop non-conflict primes) increased 
subsequent negative judgments of neutral target stimuli. Again, this supports the notion 
that conflicts, as compared to non-conflicts, inherit aversiveness, and that this 
aversiveness influences subsequent behavior (i.e., the judgment of neutral stimuli in that 
study). However, there are still many unknowns when it comes to the exact nature, 
function and boundary conditions of the aversive signals elicited by conflict stimuli. This 
study aims to elucidate specifically the temporal dynamics of the aversive nature of 
conflict stimuli.    
 Typically, affective priming is observed with short stimulus onset asynchronies 
(SOAs, i.e., the time interval between the onset of the prime and the onset of the target 
stimulus) of 300 ms or less but is not found with longer SOAs (Avero & Cavo, 2006; De 
Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 1998; Fazio et al., 1986; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 
1994; 2001; Hermans, et al., 2003; Klauer, Roßnagel, & Musch, 1997). For two reasons, 
this has been taken as evidence that the affective evaluation of a stimulus and the 
generation of object attitudes is a highly automatic process (Fazio et al., 1986; see 
Hermans et al., 2001). First, it has been argued that SOAs of 300 ms or less are too short 
to evoke conscious expectancies or controlled response strategies. And second, if 
affective priming effects were a result of controlled processes, then these effects should 
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become even stronger (or be at least just as strong) with increasing SOAs because 
controlled processes are more time consuming than automatic processes. This, however, 
is not the case: Affective priming effects typically decrease with increasing SOA (e.g., 
De Houwer et al., 1998).  
So far, the time course of affective priming has been studied mainly by using 
words (e.g., De Houwer et al., 1998; Fazio et al., 1986; Hermans et al., 1994; 2001; Klauer 
et al., 1997) or pictures (e.g., Avero & Calvo, 2006; Hermans et al., 1994; 2003) as 
primes, respectively. The question that we are interested in is whether the aversive 
conflict signal, as measured previously (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a; Fritz & Dreisbach, 
2013), is also a result of an automatic evaluation process or a consequence of a controlled 
evaluation process. After all, there is a lot of evidence in the literature that conflict stimuli 
trigger processes of cognitive control (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Kerns et al., 2004). 
And the SOA of 400 ms in our previous studies does not really allow drawing any strong 
conclusions with respect to the automaticity of the evaluation process because 400 ms 
might just be at the border from automatic to controlled processing. Therefore, in the 
present study, we again used an affective priming paradigm (see Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013) 
but this time varied SOAs in three steps of 200 ms, 400 ms and 800 ms, respectively. For 
the 400 ms SOA, we expected to replicate previous results (more negative evaluations 
following conflict as compared to non-conflict primes). Priming effects for the other two 
SOAs will then be indicative of the level of automaticity of the conflict priming effect. 
Conflict priming as a result of an automatic evaluation should result in a priming effect 
already after 200 ms and be reduced or even absent with a SOA of 800 ms. Conversely, 
if conflict priming results from a controlled evaluation process it should increase with 
increasing SOA and thus even be stronger with a SOA of 800 ms.  
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EXPERIMENT 2A 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Eighty-eight students (mean age: 22.0, SD = 2.3; 62 female, 26 male) from the University 
of Regensburg participated in exchange for partial course credit or payment (3 Euros). 4 
left-handers who participated without meeting requirements (being right-handed), 6 
participants who showed a strong valence bias (more than 75% of judgments in either 
valence), 2 participants who had difficulties in a color identification test and 4 participants 
who had exceptionally high error rates in catch trials (more than 25%) were excluded, 
leaving a final sample of 72 participants (24 participants per SOA condition). 
 
Material 
The German color words for RED, GREEN, BLUE, YELLOW, and PURPLE (ROT, 
GRÜN, BLAU, GELB, LILA) printed in red, green, blue, yellow, or purple served as 
primes. If color word and word color matched (such as RED printed in red, for example), 
the prime was a non-conflict prime; if color word and word color mismatched (such as 
RED printed in blue, for example), the prime was a conflict prime. Targets were 138 
German words (109 nouns, 18 verbs, and 11 adjectives selected on the basis of neutral 
affective ratings from the Berlin affective word-list reloaded BAWL-R (mean valence 
ratings: -.00, running on a scale from 3 (very negative) through 0 (neutral) to 3 (very 
positive), SD = .00; range of ratings: .109; Võ et al., 2009). Primes and targets were 
written in Arial bold (26 pt), subtending a visual angle of 0.8° X 0.8° at a viewing distance 
of 55 cm and were presented centrally on a light grey background.  
 
Procedure 
Participants’ task was to judge the valence of neutral German words that were preceded 
by non-conflict or conflict Stroop primes. Positive judgments had to be indicated by a 
right key press, negative judgments by a left key press (‘-’ and ‘y‘ on a QWERTZ-
keyboard, respectively). This assignment was held constant as people have a natural bias 
to associate positive concepts with their dominant body side (i.e., the right side in a right-
hander sample; Cassasanto, 2009; see also Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a; Fritz & 
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Dreisbach, 2013). Participants were instructed to choose each key at approximately the 
same rate. By that, we tried to minimize potential response biases. In order to ensure the 
processing of the Stroop primes, we interspersed catch trials in the experiment: Whenever 
the prime entailed the color word PURPLE or another color word was printed in purple, 
participants did not have to judge the subsequently presented target but had to press the 
space bar as fast as possible instead. By that, participants had to encode both the color 
and word dimension of the Stroop primes properly and thus a conflict experience in 
conflict primes was warranted.  
 Trials started with the presentation of a fixation cross for 250 ms, followed by a 
(conflict or non-conflict) Stroop prime. Depending on the stimulus onset asynchrony 
(SOA), the Stroop primes were either presented for 200 ms (SOA 200 ms) or 400 ms 
(SOA 400 ms and SOA 800 ms). In the SOA 800 ms condition, an additional blank screen 
was presented for 400 ms after the Stroop primes. Immediately after the respective SOA, 
the target was presented until participants’ response. After an inter-trial-interval (ITI) of 
1000 ms length a new trial started. In the case of an error (if participants missed a catch 
trial or wrongly identified a regular Stroop prime as a catch trial), the ITI was prolonged 
to 2500 ms and the German word for ERROR (FEHLER) appeared on screen. For 
schematic trial sequences depending on SOA condition see also Figure 4. 
 After a short test to exclude color blindness, the experiment started with two short 
practice blocks of 24 trials length to familiarize participants with the task. After that, an 
experimental block of 114 trials followed. In this block, 48 non-conflict, 48 conflict, and 
18 catch primes were followed randomly by one of the 114 neutral target words none of 
which had been used in the practice blocks. Trials were presented in random order for 
each subject. The experiment lasted about 6 minutes (SOA 200 ms), 7 minutes (SOA 400 
ms) or 8 minutes (SOA 800 ms), respectively. 
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Figure 4. Trial sequences for correct trials in SOA conditions 200 ms, 400 ms and 800 ms, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Design 
A 3 (SOA: 200 ms vs. 400 ms vs. 800 ms) X 2 (Prime Condition: non-conflict vs. conflict) 
mixed factors design was applied. SOA was manipulated between participants to be able 
to present each neutral target word only once per participant. By this we aimed to avoid 
a possible mere exposure effect (for a review see Bornstein, 1989) which might have 
caused a positivity bias (but see Klauer, Teige-Mocigemba, & Voss, 2009). Prime 
Condition was manipulated within participants. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Mean error rate in catch trials did not differ between SOA groups, F(2, 69) < 1, p > .56, 
and was low (6 %, SD = .3 %), suggesting that participants properly encoded both word 
and color dimension of the Stroop primes. To test for a general valence bias in judgments, 
we computed mean frequencies of negative judgments for correct trials for each subject. 
As frequency of negative judgments did not differ between SOA conditions, F(2, 69) < 1, 
p > .93, we conducted a one-sampled t-test against the null hypothesis of 50% negative 
judgments over all SOA conditions. Results show that participants evaluated the words 
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rather positive (44% negative judgments, SD = 8 %, t (71) = 5.83, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 
1.38). 
 To test for conflict priming, we computed mean frequencies of negative judgments 
for correct trials for each prime condition and each subject separately and conducted a 3 
X 2 – mixed factors ANOVA with the between factor SOA (200 ms, 400 ms, 800 ms) and 
the within factor Prime Condition (non-conflict, conflict). There was a significant main 
effect of Prime Condition, F (1, 69) = 6.19, p < .05, ŋ2 = .08, which was further modulated 
by SOA, F (2, 69) = 3.82, p < .05, ŋ2 = .1. Pairwise t-tests revealed that participants judged 
neutral German words more frequently as negative after conflict as compared to non-
conflict primes when the SOA between prime and target onset was 200 ms (48 % vs. 42 
%, respectively; t (23) = 2.15, p = .04, Cohen’s d =1.62) and when the SOA was 400 ms 
(47 % vs. 40 %, respectively; t (23) = 3.42, p = .00, Cohen’s d =1.24), but not for a SOA 
of 800 ms (44 % vs. 45 %, respectively; t (23) < 1, p = .47). Further post-hoc analyses 
showed that there was no difference in the conflict priming effect between SOA 
conditions 200 ms and 400 ms, F(1, 46) < 1, p > .73, but that the conflict priming effect 
differed significantly between conditions 800 ms and 200 ms and between conditions 800 
ms and 400 ms (F(1, 46) = 6.76, p < .05, ŋ2 = .13 and F(1, 46) = 4.02, p = .05, ŋ2 = .08, 
respectively; see Figure 5).  
Mean reaction times (RT) for each prime-target combination of each SOA 
condition were entered into a 3 X 2 X 2 – mixed factors ANOVA with the between factor 
SOA (200 ms, 400 ms, 800 ms) and the within factors Prime Condition (non-conflict, 
conflict) and Judgment (negative, positive). The main effect of Judgment was significant, 
F(1, 71) = 9.69, p < .01, ŋ2 = .12. RTs were faster for positive as compared to negative 
judgments (1035.6 ms vs. 1090.91 ms, respectively). No further main effects or 
interactions approached significance (all F < 1.32, all p > .27). For mean RTs see Table 
2, Appendix. 
The data of Experiment 2A replicate our earlier findings of conflict priming (i.e., 
increased negative judgments of neutral words) with a SOA of 400 ms (Dreisbach & 
Fischer, 2012a; Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013). Furthermore, conflict priming is still present 
when reducing the SOA to 200 ms, but is absent when increasing the SOA to 800 ms. 
This suggests that conflict priming is a rapid, automatic process as opposed to a rather 
slow, controlled process.  
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Figure 5. Negative judgments (%) of neutral targets as a function of Prime Condition (non-conflict 
prime, conflict prime) and Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA: 200 ms, 400 ms, 800 ms) in 
Experiment 2A. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.   
 
 
However, in Experiment 2A, there were two possible confounds that might call 
our interpretation into question. First, in Experiment 2A, SOA was confounded with the 
prime’s presentation duration. Prime duration was 200 ms in the SOA 200 ms condition, 
but 400 ms in the SOA 400 ms and SOA 800 ms conditions. Second, catch trials were 
always incongruent in Experiment 2A, which might have increased the aversiveness of 
incongruent primes by rendering congruent primes as safety signals (because congruency 
signaled NO catch prime). In order to eliminate these shortcomings, we included 
incongruent as well as congruent catch trials in the second experiment and presented the 
primes for 200 ms in all SOA conditions.  
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EXPERIMENT 2B 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
One hundred and ten students (mean age: 22.0, SD = 4.2; 92 female, 18 male) from the 
University of Regensburg participated in exchange for partial course credit or payment 
(2 Euros). 5 participants who showed a strong valence bias (more than 75% of judgments 
in either valence), 2 participants who had difficulties in a color identification test, 9 
participants who had exceptionally high error rates in catch trials (more than 25%) and 4 
participants who kept asking for instructions during the experiment15 were excluded, 
leaving a final sample of 90 participants (30 participants per SOA condition)16. 
 
Material and Procedure   
Material and Procedure of Experiment 2B was identical to Experiment 2A, with two 
exceptions. First, half of the 18 catch trials were congruent (that is, PURPLE printed in 
purple). The other half was incongruent, that is, each participant was presented with 9 
randomly chosen catch trials that consisted of either the word PURPLE printed in red, 
yellow, green, or blue, or the words RED, YELLOW, GREEN, or BLUE printed in 
purple, drawn with replacement. Second, the Stroop primes were presented for 200 ms in 
each of the three SOA conditions. Thus, in the SOA 400 ms condition the prime was 
followed by a blank screen for 200 ms; and in the SOA 800 ms condition, the prime was 
followed by a blank screen for 600 ms. 
 
Design 
A 3 (SOA: 200 ms vs. 400 ms vs. 800 ms) X 2 (Prime Condition: non-conflict vs. conflict) 
mixed factors design was applied. SOA was manipulated between participants, Prime 
Condition was manipulated within participants. 
 
                                                          
15 These four participants kept asking questions during the experiment how fast they should press the space 
bar in response to the catch trials, and/or whether they still had to judge the valence of the target words 
following a catch trial. 
16 The interaction Prime condition by SOA, found in Experiment 2A, was not significant after N=60 in 
Experiment 2B. To make sure that this null effect was not due to a lack of power, we decided to add 10 
participants in each SOA condition. 
 
   STUDY 2 – THE TIME COURSE OF THE AVERSIVE CONFLICT SIGNAL 
 
50 
Results and Discussion 
 
Mean error rate in catch trials was low (6 %, SD = .3 %), suggesting that participants 
properly encoded both word and color dimension of the Stroop primes. Furthermore, 
mean error rate in catch trials did marginally differ between SOA groups, F (2, 87) = 2.57, 
p = .08, ŋ2 = .06. T-tests (two-sided) revealed that participants missed the catch trials more 
often in the 400 ms (9 %, SD = 7 %) than in the 800 ms condition (5 %, SD = 7 %), t (58) 
= 2.02, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 0.53, while catch trial error frequencies did not differ between 
the 200 ms condition (6 %, SD = 5 %) and both the 400 ms and 800 ms conditions, both 
t’s < 1.64, both p’s > .11. To test for a general valence bias in judgments, we computed 
mean frequencies of negative judgments for correct trials for each subject. As frequency 
of negative judgments did not differ between SOA conditions, F (2, 87) < 1, p = .47, we 
conducted a one-sampled t-test against the null hypothesis of 50% negative judgments 
over all SOA conditions. Results show that participants evaluated the words rather 
positive (45% negative judgments, SD = .1 %, t (89) = 5.98, p < .001). 
 To test for conflict priming, we computed mean frequencies of negative judgments 
for correct trials for each prime condition and each subject separately and conducted a 3 
X 2 – mixed factors ANOVA with the between factor SOA (200 ms, 400 ms, 800 ms) and 
the within factor Prime Condition (non-conflict, conflict). There was a significant main 
effect of Prime Condition, F (1, 89) = 5.72, p < .05, ŋ2 = .06, which was however not 
further modulated by SOA, F < 1, p > .05. Participants judged neutral German words more 
frequently as negative after conflict as compared to non-conflict primes (46 % vs. 43 %, 
respectively; see Figure 6). 
Again, mean reaction times (RT) for each prime-target combination of each SOA 
condition were entered into a 3 X 2 X 2 – mixed factors ANOVA with the between factor 
SOA (200 ms, 400 ms, 800 ms) and the within factors Prime Condition (non-conflict, 
conflict) and Judgment (positive, negative). The main effect of Judgment was significant, 
F (1, 87) = 9.22, p < .01, ŋ2 = .09. RTs were faster for positive as compared to negative 
judgments (1088.86 ms vs. 1124.30 ms, respectively). The main effect of Prime 
Condition was significant, F (1, 87) = 15.63, p < .001, ŋ2 = .15. RTs were faster after non-
conflict as compared to conflict primes (1079.55 ms vs. 1133.61 ms, respectively). No 
further main effect or interaction was significant, all F’s < 2.51, all p’s >.12. For mean 
RTs see Table 3, Appendix. 
 
   STUDY 2 – THE TIME COURSE OF THE AVERSIVE CONFLICT SIGNAL 
 
51 
 
Figure 6. Negative judgments (%) of neutral targets as a function of Prime Condition (non-conflict 
prime, conflict prime) and Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA; 200 ms, 400 ms, 800 ms) in 
Experiment 2B. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.   
 
The results from Experiment 2B do not support the idea that conflict priming 
effects found in Experiment 2A can be explained by a catch trial-congruency-confound. 
Although prime congruency did no longer predict the absence of a catch trial (such that 
non-conflict primes no longer served as safety signal and conflict primes did not cause 
arousal by means of association), participants still judged neutral German words more 
frequently as negative after conflict as compared to non-conflict primes. This is also in 
line with the study by Dreisbach and Fischer (2012), where conflict priming was found 
and no catch primes were included in the first place. The overall smaller effect size of the 
priming effect in Experiment 2 as compared to Experiment 2A might indicate that the 
catch trial-congruency confound added to the conflict priming effect in Experiment 2A 
and/or that passive decay during the interval between prime presentation and target 
presentation reduced the conflict priming effect in Experiment 2B. Taken together, the 
results suggest that conflicts are in fact inherently aversive. This aversiveness influences 
the processing of subsequently presented information, i.e., the neutral German words.  
Interestingly and in contrast to Experiment 2A, conflict priming did not interact 
with SOA in Experiment 2B. It seems that with a longer SOA (800 ms), conflict priming 
not only depends on the SOA but also on the prime’s presentation duration: Conflict 
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priming with a SOA of 800 ms is observed with a presentation duration of 200 ms 
(Experiment 2B), but is absent with a presentation duration of 400 ms (Experiment 2A). 
While in Experiment 2A, the absence of conflict priming could be explained by either 
passive decay of the affective valence with time or active counter-regulation of the 
cognitive system, the additional results of Experiment 2B might serve as a first hint that 
both, passive decay and active counter-regulation are involved. Whereas passive decay 
should predominantly occur during the interval (i.e., the blank screen) between prime 
presentation and target onset, active counter-regulation should increase with increasing 
prime duration. Even though comparisons between experiments should be treated with 
caution17, the overall smaller effect size of the priming effect in Experiment 2B as 
compared to Experiment 2A might be taken as evidence for passive decay during the 
interval between prime presentation and target presentation. At the same time, the 
comparison between SOA 800 conditions of Experiment 2A and 2B might be taken as a 
first hint for active counter-regulation with increasing prime duration.  
In order to gain more direct support for the hypothesis that active counter-
regulation depends on the prime’s presentation duration, we ran a third experiment, this 
time presenting the prime for the entire SOA of 800 ms. If counter-regulation indeed 
increases with increasing prime duration, then conflict priming should be reversed in 
Experiment 2C.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2C 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Twenty-four students (mean age: 24, SD = 3.4; 19 female, 5 male; 7 left-handed, 17 right-
handed) from the University of Regensburg participated in exchange for partial course 
credit or payment (2 Euros). 2 participants who showed a strong valence bias (more than 
                                                          
17 The comparison of Experiments 2A, 2B and 2C needs to be done with caution. In Experiment 2A, 20 
participants were tested per condition and primes were presented for 200 ms in the 200 ms condition and 
400 ms in the 400 ms and 800 ms conditions; furthermore, catch trials were incongruent only. In Experiment 
2B, 30 participants were tested per condition and primes were presented for 200 ms in all conditions; here, 
catch trials could be congruent or incongruent. In Experiment 2C, 20 participants were tested and primes 
were presented for 800 ms; here, catch trials again could be congruent or incongruent. 
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75% of judgments in either valence), 1 participant who was talkative during the 
experiment and 1 participant who had exceptionally high error rates in catch trials (more 
than 25%) were excluded, leaving a final sample of 20 participants. 
 
Material and Procedure   
Material and Procedure of Experiment 2C was identical to Experiment 2B, with the 
exception that the Stroop primes were now presented for 800 ms and there was 
consequently no blank screen between prime and target. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Mean error rate in catch trials was low (4%, SD = .2%), suggesting that participants 
properly encoded both word and color dimension of the Stroop primes. To test for a 
general valence bias in judgments, we computed mean frequencies of negative judgments 
for correct trials for each subject and conducted a one-sampled t-test against the null 
hypothesis of 50% negative judgments. Results show that participants evaluated the 
words rather positive (43% negative judgments, SD = .1%, t (19) = 3.38, p < .01). 
 To test for conflict priming, we computed mean frequencies of negative judgments 
for correct trials for each prime condition (non-conflict, conflict) and each subject 
separately and conducted a two-sided t-test. There was a significant effect of Prime 
Condition, t(19) = 2.61, p < .05, Cohen’s d = .43. Participants judged neutral words more 
often as negative after non-conflict as compared to after conflict primes (45 % vs. 41 %, 
respectively). Mean reaction times (RT) for each prime-target combination were entered 
into a 2 X 2 – ANOVA with the within factors Prime Condition (non-conflict, conflict) 
and Judgment (negative, positive). No main effect or interaction was significant, all F’s 
< 2.49, all p’s >.102. For mean RTs see Table 4, Appendix. 
Results of Experiment 2C are clear-cut. Increasing the prime duration to 800 ms 
and reducing the blank between prime and target to zero lead to a significant reversal: 
neutral target words were now judged significantly less negative following conflict 
primes as compared to non-conflict primes. This result cannot be explained by passive 
decay (which should only have assimilated the frequency of negative judgments 
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following conflict and non-conflict primes) but is strongly suggestive of an active 
counter-regulation process in response to aversive conflict primes.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The aim of this study was to investigate the time course of the conflict signal in order to 
elucidate the automaticity of the underlying evaluation processes. In three experiments, 
participants had to judge the valence of neutral German words that were always preceded 
by congruent or incongruent Stroop primes. In Experiment 2A, the SOA was set to 200 
ms, 400 ms or 800 ms (with prime presentation times of 200 ms, 400 ms and 400 ms, 
respectively). As predicted, conflict priming (i.e., increased frequency of negative 
judgments after conflict as compared to non-conflict Stroop primes) was present for 
SOAs of 200 ms and 400 ms, but was completely absent and descriptively even reversed 
with a SOA of 800 ms. Thus, results of Experiment 2A replicate prior findings of conflict 
aversiveness with a SOA of 400 ms (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a; Fritz & Dreisbach, 
2013), and further show that the aversive quality of conflicts is present already 200 ms 
after stimulus onset and that it has disappeared 800 ms after stimulus onset. The finding 
that affective priming with Stroop primes is present with short SOAs but absent with 
longer SOAs suggests that conflict priming effects are due to the automatic evaluation of 
Stroop conflicts and not a result of controlled evaluation processes. Our results are also 
in line with findings from a recent study by Aarts, De Houwer, and Pourtois (2012). 
There, participants performed an error priming study similar to the conflict priming 
paradigm used in our work with the difference that participants were primed with their 
self-generated actions. In particular, participants had to judge the valence of positive and 
negative target words right after correct responses or errors in a Go/No-Go task. That is, 
accuracy of the preceding response served as a prime for the following affective target 
evaluation. In three experiments, the authors also manipulated the interval between the 
error or correct response and target word onset (300 ms, 600 ms and 1000 ms). Consistent 
with our findings and the interpretation of an error as an instance of conflict between the 
actual response and a post-error correcting response (Botvinick et al., 2001; but see e.g. 
Holroyd & Coles, 2002, for a different account on error monitoring processes), Aarts et 
al. (2012) found faster RTs for valence congruent as compared to valence incongruent 
prime-target combinations. That is, they found faster categorization of negative targets 
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after errors as compared to after correct responses and faster categorization of positive 
targets after correct responses as compared to after errors. Moreover, and in line with the 
results presented here, this priming effect was only found in the two short SOAs, i.e., in 
the 300 ms and 600 ms condition, but not for the long SOA of 1000 ms, strengthening the 
idea of automatic evaluation of conflict aversiveness.  
In Experiment 2B, a possible influence of a catch trial – congruency confound in 
Experiment 2A (where only incongruent catch primes were included, possibly rendering 
congruency as safety signal) was ruled out by including incongruent and congruent catch 
trials. Again, participants judged neutral targets more often as negative after conflict as 
compared to non-conflict primes. Furthermore, prime presentation time was set to 200 
ms in all three SOA conditions of Experiment 2B. In contrast to Experiment 2A, conflict 
priming did no longer interact with SOA, an effect primarily driven by the conflict 
priming-effect in the 800 ms SOA condition (which had been descriptively reversed in 
Experiment 2A). Together with the finding of Experiment 2C, where the prime 
presentation of 800 ms significantly reversed the conflict-priming effect, resulting in 
more positive judgments following conflict as compared to non-conflict primes, our 
results suggest that prime duration increases affective counter-regulation. The SOA 800 
ms conditions over all three experiments show that conflict priming decreased with 
increasing prime duration (see Figure 7). These results speak against a pure passive decay 
explanation with a SOA of 800 ms. Instead, it seems that with a long SOA, longer prime 
presentation leads to the initiation of an active counter-regulation process (cf. 
Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008) that counteracts the negative affect associated with 
conflicts by inducing a positive processing bias. The observation that this reversed 
priming effect was only found for a prime presentation of 800 ms suggests that the 
presumably resource-consuming counter-regulation process is only active in the face of 
persisting conflict stimulation. Thus, our study is the first to show that the trial-wise 
presentation of conflict stimuli induces negative affective-motivational states that elicit 
processes of affective counter-regulation when presented long enough (see also 
Rothermund, 2003, for a demonstration of feedback-induced affective counter-regulation 
on a single trial level). 
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Figure 7. Negative judgments (%) of neutral targets as a function of Prime Condition (non-conflict 
prime, conflict prime) and Prime presentation duration (200 ms, 400 ms, and 800 ms) in the SOA 
800 ms conditions of Experiments 2A, 2B and 2C. Error bars represent standard errors of the 
mean.   
 
 
To conclude, the results of this study replicate earlier findings of conflict 
aversiveness at a SOA of 400 ms (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a; Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013) 
and show that Stroop conflict stimuli are experienced as aversive as soon as 200 ms after 
stimulus onset. Furthermore, our results are in line with findings that with long SOAs, the 
cognitive system works in a more controlled processing mode that opposes automatic 
affective priming effects (e.g., De Houwer et al., 1998). This interpretation offers a bridge 
to the conflict monitoring account (Botvinick et al., 2001) which postulates that conflict 
triggers the mobilization of cognitive control. So far, these control processes have only 
been measured and interpreted in terms of sequential action regulation, they might 
however also represent an instantiation of affect regulation. From this perspective, 
cognitive conflicts would not only trigger processing adjustments as evidenced by 
reduced response interference in trials following conflict trials (e.g., Botvinick et al, 
2001), but also trigger control processes to down-regulate the aversive experience of 
conflicts (e.g., Rothermund, 2011). This, again, would further support the notion that 
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presumably “cold” cognitive and “hot” emotional processes actually share common 
grounds (see e.g. Shackman et al., 2011).  
In conclusion, the results of this study replicate earlier findings of conflict 
aversiveness at a SOA of 400 ms (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a; Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013) 
and show that Stroop conflict stimuli are experienced as aversive as soon as 200 ms after 
stimulus onset. Furthermore, the persisting presence of a conflict stimulus for 800 ms 
resulted in a significant reversal of the conflict priming effect suggesting a conflict-
triggered process of affective counter-regulation.  
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APPENDIX  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Mean RTs for target judgments in SOA conditions 200 ms, 400 ms, and 800 ms as a function of Prime Condition  
(conflict prime, non-conflict prime) and Judgment (negative, positive) in Experiment 2A (standard deviations in parantheses).   
 
 
 
 
SOA condition 
 
 
 
 
Total 
 
200 ms 
 
400 ms 
 
800 ms 
 
 
Conflict 
prime 
Non-
conflict 
prime 
 
Conflict 
prime 
Non-
conflict 
prime 
 
Conflict 
prime 
Non-
conflict 
prime 
Conflict 
prime 
Non-
conflict 
prime 
Negative 
Judgment 
 
1086.42 
(390.01) 
1064.31 
(384.45) 
 
1184.30 
(473.83) 
1140.38 
(461.07) 
 
1046.42 
(310.86) 
1034.19 
(313.38) 
1099.04 
(396.99) 
1079.63 
(388.05) 
Positive 
Judgment 
 
1056.43 
(367.19) 
999.1 
(332.9) 
 
1105.22 
(406.61) 
1094.96 
(456.01) 
 
964.19 
(282.74) 
994.75 
(337.87) 
1041.95 
(355.81) 
1029.61 
(377.38) 
Total 
 
1066.92 
(372.85) 
1024.72 
(348.04) 
 
1140.50 
(436.91) 
1108.84 
(453.49) 
 
990.22 
(290.01) 
1010.01 
(318.37) 
1065.88 
(371.4) 
1047.86 
(374.99) 
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Table 3. Mean RTs for target judgments in SOA conditions 200 ms, 400 ms, and 800 ms as a function of Prime Condition  
(conflict prime, non-conflict prime) and Judgment (negative, positive) in Experiment 2B (standard deviations in parantheses).   
 
 
 
 
SOA condition 
 
 
 
 
Total 
 
200 ms 
 
400 ms 
 
800 ms 
 
 
Conflict 
prime 
Non-
conflict 
prime 
 
Conflict 
prime 
Non-
conflict 
prime 
 
Conflict 
prime 
Non-
conflict 
prime 
Conflict 
prime 
Non-
conflict 
prime 
Negative 
Judgment 
 
1232.01 
(528.87) 
1146.49 
(480.68) 
 
1110.2 
(264.6) 
1057.80 
(245.52) 
 
1140.67 
(419.33) 
1058.66 
(399.08) 
1160.96 
(417.08) 
1087.65 
(385.46) 
Positive 
Judgment 
 
1148.95 
(435.51) 
1110.51 
(507.44) 
 
1073.74 
(257.09) 
1016.43 
(245.85) 
 
1096.09 
(368.3) 
1087.44 
(385.13) 
1106.26 
(358.53) 
1071.46 
(391.85) 
Total 
 
1190.48 
(472.01) 
1128.5 
(488.23) 
 
1092.0 
(239.88) 
1037.12 
(239.88) 
 
1118.39 
(389.01) 
1073.05 
(381.37) 
1133.61 
(379.86) 
1079.55 
(381.86) 
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Table 4. Mean RTs for target judgments as a function of 
Prime Condition (conflict prime, non-conflict prime) and 
Judgment (negative, positive) in Experiment 2C (standard 
deviations in parantheses).  
 
  
Conflict 
prime 
Non-
conflict 
prime 
Total 
Negative 
Judgment 
 
 1124.17 
(180.36) 
1162.38 
(267.87) 
1143.27 
(216.51) 
Positive 
Judgment 
 
 1141.07 
(245.65) 
1104.99 
(216.55) 
1123.03 
(223.18) 
Total 
  
1132.62 
(205.57) 
1133.68 
(236.83) 
1133.15 
(226.55) 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Cognitive control enables adaptive behavior in a dynamically changing environment. In 
this context, one prominent adaptation effect is the sequential conflict adjustment, i.e. the 
observation of reduced response interference on trials following conflict trials. Increasing 
evidence suggests that such response conflicts are registered as aversive signals. So far, 
however, the functional role of this aversive signal for conflict adaptation to occur has 
not been put to test directly. In two experiments, the affective valence of conflict stimuli 
was manipulated by fluency of processing (stimulus contrast). Experiment 1 used a 
flanker interference task, Experiment 2 a color-word Stroop task. In both experiments, 
conflict adaptation effects were only present in fluent, but absent in disfluent trials. 
Results thus speak against the simple idea that any aversive stimulus feature is suited to 
promote specific conflict adjustments. Two alternative but not mutually exclusive 
accounts, namely resource competition and adaptation-by-motivation, will be discussed.     
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In an environment full of tempting opportunities and action affordances, appropriate 
action selection is a constant challenge. For example, grabbing the low fat yogurt 
instead of the rich but more delicious chocolate mousse from the fridge can be a hard 
decision. In situations like this, cognitive control supports the selection of the weaker 
but intended action in the face of a stronger but inadequate action (c.f. Miller & Cohen, 
2001). Moreover, when confronted with response conflicts, cognitive control not only 
enables conflict resolution in the current trial but also adjusts processing parameters 
such that the cognitive system is better prepared when the response conflict repeats as 
indicated by reduced response interference in post-conflict trials (Botvinick, Nystrom, 
Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Caessens, Notebaert, Burle, & Soetens, 2005; Egner, 
2008; Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992; Notebaert, Soetens, & Melis, 2001; Stürmer, 
Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer, 2002; Wühr & Kunde, 2008). On a neuronal 
level, it has been suggested that it is the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) that detects 
conflicts and sends this information to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex which then 
increases control in the post-conflict trial (e.g., Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; 
Kerns et al., 2004).  
In the past decade, huge advances have been made to further our understanding 
of the underlying processes that enable such dynamic control adaptations (for recent 
approaches to conflict adaptation effects see for example Braem et al., 2014; Duthoo 
et al., 2014; Jiang, Heller, & Egner, 2014). Questions of interest concerned the locus 
and specificity of the adaptation effect (e.g., Kiesel, Kunde & Hoffmann, 2006; Kunde 
& Wühr, 2006; Notebaert & Verguts, 2008; Wendt, Luna-Rodriguez & Jacobsen, 
2012), the role of episodic retrieval and priming processes (e.g., Hommel, Proctor, & 
Vu, 2004; Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003), the role of learning (e.g., Blais, Robidoux, 
Risko, & Besner, 2007; Blais & Verguts, 2012; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Verguts & 
Notebaert, 2009), timing (e.g., Goschke & Dreisbach, 2008; Pastötter, Dreisbach & 
Bäuml, 2013; Scherbaum, Fischer, Dshemuchadse, & Goschke, 2011), conflict 
strength  (e.g., Forster, Carter, Cohen, & Cho, 2011; Takezawa & Miyatani, 2005; 
Wendt, Kiesel, Gehringswald, Purmann, & Fischer, 2014), working memory load 
(Fischer, Plessow, Kunde, & Kiesel, 2010; Soutschek, Strobach, & Schubert, 2012; 
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Stürmer, Seiss, & Leuthold, 2005), and context effects in general (e.g. Fischer, 
Dreisbach, & Goschke, 2008; Funes, Lupianez, & Humphreys, 2010).  
  Only recently, the question of how stress, affect and motivation might influence 
processing adjustments has moved into the focus of research (e.g. Braem, Verguts, 
Roggeman, & Notebaert, 2012; Kuhbandner & Zehetleitner, 2011; Padmala, Bauer, & 
Pessoa, 2011; Plessow, Fischer, Kirschbaum, & Goschke, 2011; Stürmer, Nigbur, 
Schacht, & Sommer, 2011; van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009, 2010, 2012; see 
Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a for a review). The role of affect in sequential conflict 
adaptation is of specific interest here due to the increasing evidence that conflicts 
themselves are experienced as aversive signals (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012b; Fritz & 
Dreisbach, 2013, 2015; Schouppe et al., 2012; Schouppe et al., 2015). For example, 
presenting Stroop conflict stimuli (Stroop, 1935) as primes eased the evaluation of 
negative target stimuli and increased the frequency of negative judgments for neutral 
target stimuli (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012b; Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013; 2015). 
Converging evidence in favor of the aversive conflict signal also comes from 
physiological studies showing increased heart rate (Renaud & Blondin, 1997), larger 
pupil dilatation (van Steenbergen & Band, 2013; Wendt et al., 2014), and enhanced 
skin conductance response (Kobayashi, Yoshino, Takahashi, & Nomura, 2007) in 
response to incongruent Stroop stimuli (but see Schacht, Dimigen, & Sommer, 2010, 
who, however, did not use Stroop stimuli but measured physiological activity during 
a go/no-go paradigm). Given that conflicts are detected by the ACC, and further given 
that the ACC is also activated by monetary loss (Rainville, 2002), social exclusion 
(Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003), negative feedback (Nieuwenhuis et al., 
2004), and pain (Singer et al., 2004), one might therefore speculate that it is not the 
response conflict per se but the aversive character of the response conflict that triggers 
the processing adjustments (Botvinick, 2007; Dreisbach & Fischer, 2015a, 2015b). In 
fact, Dreisbach and Fischer (2011) found that aversive stimuli can lead to sequential 
adaptation effects even in the absence of response conflicts. In that study, the authors 
made use of the fact that fluency of processing, i.e., the experienced ease of stimulus 
processing, is affectively marked, with low fluency being associated with negative and 
high fluency with positive affect (Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; Winkielman, 
   STUDY 3 – THE INFLUENCE OF NEGATIVE STIMULUS FEATURES ON CONFLICT ADAPTATION  64 
Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003)18. Dreisbach and Fischer (2011) let participants 
categorize number words according to magnitude that were either written in an easy 
(fluent) or hard to read (disfluent) font. In three experiments, the authors found 
sequential modulations of the fluency effect (performance difference between 
disfluent and fluent trials) in terms of a smaller fluency effect following disfluent trials. 
Moreover, van Steenbergen and colleagues repeatedly showed that presenting positive 
symbols in the inter-trial-intervals of an Eriksen Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 
1974) eliminated conflict adaptation effects (van Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2012; but 
see Stürmer et al., 2011; Braem et al., 2013b, Notebaert & Braem, 2015). Van 
Steenbergen and colleagues interpreted this result as indication that the positive 
symbol counteracted the aversive signal of the response conflict and thus eliminated 
conflict adaptation. 
 In sum, the observations that (1) aversive signals without response conflict 
promote sequential processing adjustments (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2011) and (2) 
positive signals following response conflict eliminate processing adjustments (van 
Steenbergen et al., 2009; 2012), might suggest that the aversive characteristic of 
conflicts itself triggers the processing adjustments19. One straightforward way to 
address the question whether it is the aversive conflict signal that triggers conflict 
adaptation is to increase the aversiveness of a given conflict stimulus and investigate 
its effects on conflict adaptation. As already mentioned above, perceptual fluency 
serves as an affective signal with high perceptual fluency being associated with 
positive affect and low perceptual fluency being associated with negative affect (Reber 
et al., 1998; Winkielman, et al., 2003). Therefore, we manipulated the aversive quality 
of a conflict signal by presenting classical response interference tasks either with high 
                                                          
18 It is important to note that it has been shown empirically that not only is perceptual fluency associated 
with positive affect but also that perceptual disfluency is associated with negative affect. In three 
experiments, Reber et al. (1998) applied different manipulations of perceptual fluency and examined the 
consequences on preference judgments. In Experiment 1, participants judged drawings that were 
preceded by mismatching primes (i.e., perceptually disfluent stimuli) as being less pretty than drawings 
that were preceded by matching primes. In Experiment 3, participants stated to dislike stimuli more that 
were presented for shorter periods of time than stimuli that were presented for longer time periods. 
Finally, and most similar to the manipulation of perceptual fluency used in the present study, in 
Experiment 2, Reber et al. let participants judge circle stimuli that varied in figure ground contrast. They 
found that the circles were judged as less pretty and more ugly with decreasing figure ground contrast, 
i.e., with decreasing perceptual fluency.  
19 There are a couple of studies, however, suggesting that it is not the affective value of conflicts but the 
rewarding effect of conflict resolution that leads to post-conflict adjustment (Braem et al., 2012; see also 
Schouppe et al., 2015).   
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perceptual fluency (fluent) or with low perceptual fluency (disfluent), expecting that 
disfluent incongruent trials are more aversive than fluent incongruent trials. 
Consequently, if it is an unspecific aversiveness conveyed by the conflict that triggers 
conflict adaptation, we should find increased conflict adaptation on disfluent trials as 
compared to fluent trials, as disfluency is assumed to increase the general aversiveness 
of conflicts even further. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 3A 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Thirty students of the University of Regensburg were tested (23 female; 24 right-
handers; mean age: 26.6, SD = 4.1). All participants signed informed consent before 
the experiment and received 3 Euros or partial course credit after its completion. Data 
of two participants with RTs that were more than 2 SDs above at least one group cell 
mean were excluded from the analysis, leaving a final sample of 28 participants.   
 
Material and Procedure 
Stimuli consisted of a central color-square horizontally flanked by two color-squares, 
one on each side. The three horizontally aligned squares subtended a visual angle of 
19.9° x 6.6° at a viewing distance of 60 cm. Square colors were red, green, and blue. 
Congruency was manipulated by color match or mismatch: The color of the central 
square could either match (congruent stimulus) or mismatch (incongruent stimulus) 
the color of the two flanking squares which were always of the same color. Fluency 
was manipulated by figure-ground contrast differences. In fluent stimuli, color 
saturation was 100%, in disfluent stimuli, color saturation was 50%. Fluency of 
relevant and irrelevant stimulus dimensions was manipulated to the same extent by 
stimulus contrast such that no effect on the conflict per se is to be expected (Miles & 
Proctor, 2009). The stimuli were presented centrally on a white background. 
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Participants were instructed to quickly and accurately identify the color of the central 
square by pressing one of three keys on a QWERTZ keyboard (“c” for green, “v” for 
red, “b” for blue, respectively) with their index, middle and ring finger of their 
dominant hand (see Larson, Kaufman, & Perlstein, 2009, for a similar procedure). 
Each trial started with a plus sign as fixation cross for 250 ms, followed by the 
imperative stimulus that was presented until a response was given. For correct 
responses, the next trial started after 1000 ms. For errors, the German word for error 
(Fehler) appeared and remained on screen for 1000 ms. After an additional 500 ms, 
the next trial started. The experiment started with a short test to exclude color 
blindness, followed by a color-to-key-mapping practice block of 12 randomly 
presented imperative stimuli and a second practice block of 24 imperative stimuli 
where participants were introduced to the fluency manipulation. After that, one 
practice block of 120 trials followed consisting of 30 congruent and 30 incongruent 
fluent and disfluent trials, respectively. This practice block was followed by 3 
experimental blocks of 120 trials each. Blocks were separated from one another by 
self-paced breaks. Repetition of identical target stimuli was not allowed. Because we 
were interested in how fluency modulates conflict adaptation, we presented fluent and 
disfluent trials in runs of ten in a given block while for the assessment of conflict 
adaptation, conflict versus non-conflict trials varied randomly from trial to trial. The 
experiment lasted about 25 minutes. 
 
Design 
A 2 (CongruencyN) x 2 (CongruencyN-1) x 2 (Fluency) repeated measures design was 
used.  
 
Data preprocessing 
We excluded the first two trials of each fluency block of 10 trials length in order to 
remove possible transition effects from the previous fluency condition. In order to 
decrease the influence of low-level feature repetitions and to maximize cognitive 
control involvement in conflict adaptation (e.g., Egner, 2007), partial priming trials 
(whenever the color of either the central or flanking stimulus repeated from trial N-1 
to trial N (42.3%)) and negative priming trials (whenever the color of the flanking 
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squares in trial N-1 was the color of the central square in trial N (18.5%)) were 
excluded prior to analysis (see also Bugg, 2008; Larson et al., 2009; Ullsperger, 
Bylsma, & Botvinick, 2005; Wendt et al., 2014)20. For error data analysis, mean error 
rates for the remaining data (on average 134 trials per participant) were computed for 
each cell of the 2 (CongruencyN) x 2 (CongruencyN-1) x 2 (Fluency) design and entered 
into a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA).  Additionally, for RT data 
analysis, erroneous as well as post-error trials (together 6.7%) and all RTs that 
exceeded more than two standard deviations from the individual cell mean (4.9%) 
were excluded prior to analysis. For the remaining data (on average 121 trials per 
participant), mean RTs for each cell of the 2 (CongruencyN) x 2 (CongruencyN-1) x 2 
(Fluency) design were computed and a repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Error data 
There was a marginally significant interaction of CongruencyN x CongruencyN-1, 
F(1,27) = 3.375, p = .077, ŋ2 = .111, reflecting a typical conflict adaptation effect. The 
congruency effect was less pronounced following incongruentN-1 (-1.16%) as 
compared to following congruentN-1 trials (2.42%). Importantly, this conflict 
adaptation effect was further modulated by Fluency, F(1,27) = 4.675, p < .05, ŋ2 = .145 
(see Figure 8). In fluent trials, participants showed a significant conflict adaptation 
effect, F(1,27) = 5.783, p < .05, ŋ2 = .176, i.e., an inverted congruency effect for trials 
following incongruent trials (-3.67%) as compared to following congruent trials 
(2.69%). In disfluent trials, however, the effect of CongruencyN was unaffected by 
CongruencyN-1, F < 1, p > .706, ŋ2 < .006. No further effects were significant, all Fs < 
2.873, all ps > .101, all ŋ2s < .097. 
                                                          
20 Because the post-hoc removal of all stimulus/feature repetitions is standard procedure in studying 
conflict adaptation, the experiment was from the beginning designed to provide a sufficiently large 
number of trials per cell. An a priory exclusion of critical stimulus sequences was not considered an 
option as it induces expectation biases. For a recent discussion of theoretical and practical guidelines in 
the investigations of conflict adaptation see Duthoo et al. (2014) and Egner (2014). 
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Figure 8. RTs (ms) and error rates (%) as a function of Congruency(N) and Congruency(N-1) 
for fluent (left panel) and disfluent (right panel) trials of Experiment 3A. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the mean. *denotes a significant interaction Congruency(N) X 
Congruency(N-1) 
 
 
RT data 
The main effects of CongruencyN, F(1,27) = 22.515, p < .001, ŋ2 = .464, and Fluency, 
F(1,27) = 5.051, p < .05, ŋ2 = .163, were significant. RT was lower for congruentN 
(633.45 ms) as compared to incongruentN (673.90 ms) trials and lower for fluent 
(642.59 ms) as compared to disfluent (664.76 ms) trials. Furthermore, there was a 
significant interaction of  CongruencyN x Fluency, F(1,27) = 7.239, p < .05, ŋ2 = .218: 
The Congruency effect was less pronounced in fluent (12.63 ms) as compared to 
disfluent trials (68.27 ms). No further effects were significant, all Fs < 1.019, all ps > 
.321, all ŋ2s < .039.  
The main results of Experiment 3A can be summarized as follows: The higher 
order interaction of CongruencyN X CongruencyN-1 X Fluency found in the error data 
showed the usual significant conflict adaptation effect on fluent trials (i.e., stimuli with 
high stimulus contrast as used in standard paradigms), and a significantly reduced and 
virtually absent conflict adaptation effect for disfluent trials. The results thus suggest 
that, if anything, increasing the general aversiveness of conflicts by reducing the 
stimulus contrast eliminates the conflict adaptation effect. This contradicts the idea 
that adding unspecific aversiveness to a conflict stimulus increases specific adaptation 
* 
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effects. In order to consolidate the findings from Experiment 3A, we ran a second 
experiment with a different response conflict paradigm, i.e., a manual version of the 
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). If the results from Experiment 3A (the modulation of the 
conflict adaptation effect by fluency with an elimination thereof in disfluent trials) can 
be replicated in Experiment 3B, it can be ruled out that the effects were driven by 
paradigm specific parameters and thus highlight the findings’ generalizability.   
 
 
EXPERIMENT 3B 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Thirty students of the University of Regensburg were tested (23 female; 28 right-
handers; mean age: 23.1, SD = 3.7). All participants signed informed consent before 
the experiment and received 3 Euros or partial course credit after its completion. Data 
of three participants with RTs that were more than 2 SDs above at least one group cell 
mean were excluded from the analysis, leaving a final sample of 27 participants.   
 
Material and Procedure 
Stimuli were the German color words for RED (rot), GREEN (grün), and BLUE (blau) 
printed in red, green, and blue (RGB values of 255,0,0; 0,255,0; and 0,0,255, 
respectively). The words were written in Arial bold, 24 pt, each letter subtending a 
visual angle of approximately 0.8° x 0.8° at a viewing distance of 60 cm. Congruency 
was manipulated by color-word match or mismatch: The print color could either match 
(congruent stimuli) or mismatch (incongruent stimuli) the word meaning of the 
stimulus. Again, fluency was manipulated by figure-ground contrast differences. In 
fluent stimuli, color saturation was 100%, in disfluent stimuli, color saturation was 
50%. The stimuli were presented centrally on a white background. Participants’ task 
was to quickly and accurately identify the print color of the word while ignoring its 
meaning by pressing one of three keys on a QWERTZ keyboard (“c” for green, “v” 
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for red, “b” for blue, respectively) with their index, middle, and ring finger of their 
dominant hand. Trial and block procedure remained the same as in Experiment 3A.  
 
Design  
A 2 (CongruencyN) x 2 (CongruencyN-1) x 2 (Fluency) repeated measures design was 
used.  
 
Data preprocessing 
We excluded the first two trials of each fluency block of 10 trials length in order to 
remove possible transition effects from the previous fluency condition. Furthermore, 
partial priming trials (whenever the color or color word repeated from trial N-1 to trial 
N (46.6%)) and negative priming trials (whenever the color word in trial N-1 was the 
color of the stimulus in trial N (16.2%)) were excluded prior to analysis to ensure that 
priming effects did not mask conflict adaptation. For error data analysis, mean error 
rates for the remaining data (on average 130 trials per participant) were computed for 
each cell of the 2 (CongruencyN) x 2 (CongruencyN-1) x 2 (Fluency) design and entered 
into a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Additionally, for RT data 
analysis, erroneous as well as post-error trials (together 7.5%) and all RTs that 
exceeded more than two standard deviations from the individual cell mean (4.6%) 
were excluded prior to analysis. For the remaining data (on average 118 trials per 
participant), mean RTs for each cell of the 2 (CongruencyN) x 2 (CongruencyN-1) x 2 
(Fluency) design were computed and a repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Error data 
There was a significant main effect of CongruencyN, F(1,26) = 16.335, p < .001, ŋ2 = 
.386, and a marginally significant effect of Fluency, F(1,26) = 3.028, p = .094, ŋ2 = 
.104. Error rates were lower for congruentN (2.39%) as compared to incongruentN 
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(4.65%) trials and lower for fluent (3.19%) as compared to disfluent trials (3.85%). No 
further effects were significant, all Fs < 2.331, all ps > .138, all ŋ2s < .083.  
 
 
 
Figure 9. RTs (ms) and error rates (%) as a function of Congruency(N) and Congruency(N-1) 
for fluent (left panel) and disfluent (right panel) trials of Experiment 3B. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the mean. *denotes a significant interaction Congruency(N) X 
Congruency(N-1) 
 
 
RT data 
The main effects of CongruencyN, F(1,26) = 86.941, p < .001, ŋ2 = .770, CongruencyN-
1,  F(1,26) = 10.821, p < .01, ŋ2 = .294, and Fluency, F(1,26) = 5.371, p < .05, ŋ2 = 
.171, were significant. RT was lower for trials following incongruent trials (636.34 
ms) as compared to congruent trials (659.30 ms), lower for congruentN (582.21 ms) as 
compared to incongruentN (713.42 ms) trials and lower for fluent (636.71 ms) as 
compared to disfluent (658.92 ms) trials. As in the accuracy data of Experiment 1, the 
interaction of CongruencyN x CongruencyN-1 x Fluency was significant, F(1,26) = 
6.604, p < .05, ŋ2 = .203 (see Figure 9). In fluent trials, participants showed a 
significant conflict adaptation effect, F(1,26) = 8.220, p < .01, ŋ2 = .240, i.e., a smaller 
congruency effect for trials following incongruent trials (104.56 ms) as compared to 
following congruent  trials (154.42 ms). In disfluent trials, however, the congruency 
effect was unaffected by CongruencyN-1 (137.98 ms following incongruent and 127.86 
* 
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ms following congruent trials), F = .323, p = .574, ŋ2 = .012. No further effects were 
significant, all Fs < 1.932, ps > .175, all ŋ2s < .070. 
In Experiment 3B, the higher order interaction CongruencyN X CongruencyN-1 
X Fluency was significant in the RT data. Again, the conflict adaptation effect was 
only significant in fluent trials but was eliminated in disfluent trials. Taken together, 
both experiments brought up converging evidence that sequential conflict adaptation, 
if present in fluent trials, is entirely reduced in disfluent trials. This contradicts the idea 
that any aversive signal is suited to trigger stimulus-specific adaptation effects.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Based on a theoretical framework of ACC functioning (Botvinick, 2007) and recent 
findings of (1) conflict aversiveness (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012b; Fritz & Dreisbach, 
2013; 2015; Schouppe et al., 2012; Schouppe et al., 2015), (2) elimination of conflict 
adaptation by positive action effects (van Steenbergen et al., 2009; 2012), and (3) 
sequential adaptation triggered by non-conflict aversive (disfluent) stimuli (Dreisbach 
& Fischer, 2011), we directly tested whether increasing the aversive value of conflict 
stimuli also increases sequential adaptation effects. To this end, we presented conflict 
stimuli with either high or low perceptual fluency. Because disfluency is experienced 
as aversive signal (Reber et al., 1998), this manipulation is suited to modulate the 
affective valence of conflict stimuli. If conflict adaptation is triggered by the aversive 
nature of conflict stimuli independently from the conflict information, then the 
increased negative valence of disfluent incongruent as compared to fluent incongruent 
trials might increase adaptation effects.  
Results from both experiments, however, did not support this idea. In contrast, 
whenever the typical conflict adaptation was found for fluent trials (in the error data 
in Experiment 3A and in the RT data in Experiment 3B), disfluency eliminated conflict 
adaptation effects entirely. And this cannot be explained by reduced conflict strength 
on disfluent trials because conflict was either unaffected by the fluency manipulation 
(Experiment 3B) or even increased (Experiment 3A) for disfluent trials21. In both 
                                                          
21 Miles and Proctor (2009) found that decreasing both, the discriminability of the relevant and irrelevant 
stimulus feature, does not change the magnitude of the congruency effect in two response conflict 
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experiments, conflict adaptation was only present in one of the dependent measures, 
i.e. error rates in Experiment 3A and RT data in Experiment 3B. Thus, neither RT data 
in Experiment 3A nor error rates in Experiment 3B were further modulated by 
disfluency. Indeed, there have been many studies reporting similar findings, i.e., 
conflict adaptation effects being only present in RT data OR error data (see e.g. Bugg, 
2008; Ullsperger et al., 2005; Puccioni & Vallesi, 2012; Soutschek et al., 2012; van 
Steenbergen et al., 2010; 2012). So far, there has been no study that directly addressed 
why the conflict adaptation effect is sometimes found in the RT data while it is found 
in the error data in other cases. The important result of our study, however, is that the 
dependent measure that showed the typical conflict adaptation effect on fluent trials in 
the respective experiment (i.e., error rates in Experiment 3A and RT data in 
Experiment 3B) also brought up a higher order interaction with fluency: While conflict 
adaptation is intact on fluent trials, disfluency leads to its elimination. These consistent 
findings from two independent experiments have an important implication: They 
demonstrate that increasing unspecific aversiveness, for example by decreasing 
fluency of processing, does not inevitably lead to stronger conflict adaptation but in 
contrast may even diminish it. Thus, it is conceivable that aversiveness might need to 
be tied to conflict processing and not to stimulus processing in general.  
An important question, however, remains: why does reduced fluency of 
processing (and thus, increased aversiveness) not only not increase or not affect 
conflict adaptation, but eliminates it? Here, a potential answer could be that reducing 
fluency of processing might come with side effects other than the aversive connotation 
that could directly have affected conflict adaptation. For example, processing of 
disfluent stimuli might have increased processing demands and invested effort (e.g. 
Dreisbach & Fischer, 2011). There is already ample evidence that conflict adaptation 
is modulated by processing demands of primary task processing. For example, Fischer, 
Dreisbach and Goschke (2008) had participants complete a number magnitude task 
(i.e., indicate whether a given number was bigger or smaller than 5) combined with a 
                                                          
paradigms. Thus, we assumed that in our experiments, the fluency manipulation would likewise leave 
the congruency effect unaffected. However, the interaction of fluency with congruency was significant for 
the Flanker task in Experiment 3A. Although we do not have an explanation for this effect, still, this does 
not weaken our argument: conflict adaptation is absent in disfluent as compared to fluent trials even 
though conflict magnitude was bigger in disfluent trials. It seems thus that the demotivating effect of 
continued disfluency (see Discussion below) overrules the effect of enhanced conflict aversiveness. 
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Simon task (i.e., numbers appeared on the right or left side of the screen). They found 
the typical sequential conflict adaptation in the Simon task which was further 
modulated by the cognitive demand of the number magnitude task: Following numbers 
close to the reference standard (high processing demand), the Simon adaptation was 
smaller than following numbers far from the reference standard (low processing 
demand). Likewise, Soutschek, Strobach, and Schubert (2012) reported evidence that 
high working memory load eliminates conflict adaptation in the Stroop task. Applied 
to our results presented here, one might thus argue that disfluent trials draw on 
processing resources that were then not available for conflict adaptation. Does that 
imply that the aversive character of disfluency had no effect in our study? Interestingly, 
Pessoa (2009) claimed that not only different cognitive processes share and compete 
for the same restricted resource capacities, but that cognitive and affective processes 
do so as well. Indeed, it has been shown that performance in incongruent trials 
decreased when preceded by an affective task-irrelevant picture (Hart et al., 2010), 
suggesting that the processing of the affective stimulus consumed resources that would 
otherwise have benefited conflict resolution. In the same line and more directly related 
to our study, Padmala, Bauer, and Pessoa (2011) reported that presenting highly 
arousing negative pictures as compared to neutral pictures in inter-trial-intervals of a 
Stroop-like word-face task eliminated conflict adaptation effects (see also Braem et 
al., 2013b). The authors, too, explained this finding in terms of resource competition: 
The resources that are necessary for post-conflict adaptation were consumed by the 
processing of the arousing aversive pictures and were then lacking for conflict 
adaptation. In the light of these findings, the resource competition account might 
explain our data, as well. As disfluency is associated with negative affect, the 
processing of the aversive quality in disfluent blocks may have demanded resources 
that would otherwise have been used to adapt control in post-conflict trials22.  
                                                          
22 An alternative, yet similar, explanation of reduced conflict adaptation effects in affectively negative 
conditions grounds on the idea that the effects of negative mood (cf. van Steenbergen, 2015) or more 
generally, arousal (cf. Braem, Duthoo and Notebaert, 2013a), on cognitive control follow an inverted U 
shaped function: while moderate levels of arousal are beneficial for cognitive control processes, too little 
or too much arousal is detrimental. For example, Braem et al. (2013b) found that the influence of 
punishment on conflict adaptation critically depends on individual punishment sensitivity: while punishing 
individuals low in punishment sensitivity (as measured with the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) scale) 
increased conflict adaptation in post-punishment trials, punishing highly punishment sensitive 
participants did not modulate conflict adaptation but lead to a general slow-down in RTs in post-
punishment trials. The authors interpret their data in the framework of the Yerkes-Dodson law (Yerkes & 
Dodson, 1908) and suggest that for highly punishment sensitive individuals, punishment-associated 
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A second, very recent line of research that is of interest to our results deals with 
the motivational impact of conflict resolution on conflict adaptation. According to this 
adaptation-by-motivation account, conflict adaptation is triggered by the rewarding 
experience of conflict resolution (Braem et al., 2012). This idea is grounded on the 
observation that solving a difficult task is more rewarding than solving an easy task 
(Shalley & Oldham, 1985; Satterthwaite et al., 2012). For example, Satterthwaite and 
colleagues used an n-back task and could show that the activation in the ventral 
striatum, a key region of dopamine production, increased with increasing task 
difficulty. The most direct evidence for the role of reward for conflict adaptation has 
recently been put forward by Braem and colleagues (2012). In that study, participants 
were presented with an Eriksen Flanker task (Experiment 1). In the experimental 
condition, 25% of trials of a given block were rewarded for correct and fast 
performance, whereas in the remaining 75% of the trials, no reward was given.  In the 
control condition, no reward was given ever. Results brought up sequential conflict 
adaptation effects in the control condition (no reward) and in rewarded trials in the 
experimental condition. Intriguingly, no such conflict adaptation was found for 
unrewarded trials in the reward context. According to the authors, the extrinsic reward 
signal on 25% of trials replaced or overshadowed the intrinsic reward signal normally 
generated in standard (no-reward) conflict tasks. As a consequence, the no-reward 
trials lacked the intrinsic rewarding experience that would have been necessary to 
trigger conflict adaptation.  
Back to the data presented here, the adaptation-by-motivation account also fits 
with our findings. Notably, fluency of processing has been shown to modulate 
motivation directly. For example, Song and Schwarz (2008) found that participants 
were less motivated to carry out a task that was described in a hard to read (disfluent) 
font as compared to a task described in an easy to read (fluent) font. Applied to our 
experiments, the continuous experience of disfluency throughout the mini-blocks of 
disfluent trials might have reduced the motivation to adapt. Put differently, in disfluent 
mini-blocks, the rewarding effect of a successful conflict resolution might have been 
counteracted by the discouraging continuous disfluent experience. Therefore, the 
                                                          
arousal was too high to benefit conflict adaptation. However, we do not think that this framework is suited 
to thoroughly explain our results, given that disfluency can hardly be compared to the aversive 
experience of punishment. 
   STUDY 3 – THE INFLUENCE OF NEGATIVE STIMULUS FEATURES ON CONFLICT ADAPTATION  76 
repeated disfluent experience eliminated the intrinsic reward signal that typically 
follows successful conflict resolution, thereby decreasing the conflict adaptation 
effect.  Further support for this motivational account comes from studies showing that 
an increase in participants’ motivation goes along with decreased RTs and error rates 
and decreased congruency effects, mimicking our results in the fluent as compared to 
the disfluent conditions (e.g., Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Soutschek, Strobach, & 
Schubert, 2014; Veling & Aarts, 2010).  
In sum, the two accounts presented above, i.e., the adaptation-by-motivation 
account, and the resource competition account, are equally well suited to explain our 
results. In fact, they are not mutually exclusive but closely intervened. After all, the 
negative valence of disfluency (just as the negative valence of conflict stimuli, see 
Botvinick, 2007) might at least in part be due to the increased processing demands of 
disfluent (and incongruent) trials. The only caveat might be that our results are hard to 
reconcile with the interpretation of van Steenbergen and colleagues (2009) outlined in 
the Introduction. To reiterate, the authors found no conflict adaptation following 
positive signals and argued that the positive signals presumably counteracted the 
aversive character of the conflict stimulus. Alternatively, and in line with the 
adaptation-by-motivation account, the positive signals in the van Steenbergen study 
that were presented as non-contingent performance feedback might have signaled that 
successful performance is not a value by itself and thereby counteracted the intrinsic 
reward signal (see also Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a, for a more thorough discussion). 
In sum, random reward (van Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2012; see also Stürmer et al., 
2012), no-reward in a reward context (Braem et al., 2012) and repeated experience of 
disfluency (the results presented here) have all been found to reduce or eliminate 
conflict adaptation. The common underlying mechanism might be that in all these 
situations, the intrinsic reward signal after successful conflict resolution was reduced.   
It is important to note that the present findings and the suggested interpretations 
do not at all contradict the repeatedly shown aversive nature of conflict stimuli and 
their role for conflict adaptation (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012b; Fritz & Dreisbach, 
2013, 2015; Schouppe et al., 2012; Schouppe et al., 2015). What we have shown here 
is that increasing the negative valence of conflict stimuli via disfluency (and thus 
independently from conflict strength) does not increase conflict adaptation effects.  But 
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at the same time, it is well documented that (1) disfluency triggers processing 
adjustments in terms of a reduced fluency effect (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2011) and that 
(2) conflict adaptation effects increase with increasing conflict strength (Forster et al., 
2011; Takezawa & Miyatani, 2005; Wendt et al., 2014). Therefore, we argue that the 
aversive signal conveyed by the amount of conflict triggers conflict adaptation. Yet it 
seems that aversive stimulus information from different sources (here: from perceptual 
fluency vs. response conflict) does not add up to increase sequential conflict 
adaptation. That is, the aversiveness must be tied to conflict processing and not to 
stimulus processing in general. 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
 
 
In this thesis, three studies are presented that aimed at elucidating the characteristics 
and function of the affective value of conflicts in information processing.  
STUDY 1 reinvestigated the conflict priming effect as found by Dreisbach and 
Fischer (2012a), using a different dependent variable to yield more unequivocal 
results. In two experiments, participants had to judge the valence of affectively neutral 
German words (Experiment 1A) or Chinese pictographs (Experiment 1B) after being 
primed by conflict or non-conflict Stroop primes. The results show that conflicts 
indeed are experienced as aversive events and that this affective connotation spills over 
to subsequently presented stimuli, influencing the way they are processed: being 
primed with conflicts, participants more often judged the following words or 
pictographs as negative compared to being primed with non-conflict stimuli.  
STUDY 2 aimed at exploring the time characteristics of conflict aversiveness. 
It was expected that Stroop conflict/non-conflict primes share the same time 
characteristics as other affective primes, evoking strong priming effects already with 
short SOAs. Indeed, this is what was found in two experiments: Participants again had 
to judge the valence of neutral German words after being primed by conflict or non-
conflict Stroop primes. SOAs between prime and target presentation varied between 
subjects, rendering conditions with SOAs of 200 ms, 400 ms and 800 ms. Experiments 
2A and 2B showed that conflict priming was already present with SOAs as short as 
200 ms, highlighting the automaticity of the processing of conflict-induced affect. 
Furthermore, Study 2 revealed that with increasing prime presentation duration, the 
conflict priming effect is actively counter-regulated: Comparing SOA 800 ms 
conditions over all three experiments shows that with short prime presentation (200 
ms, Experiment 2B), typical conflict priming is observed; with longer prime 
presentation (400 ms, Experiment 2C), conflict priming descriptively reverses and 
with maximum prime presentation (800 ms), conflict priming is significantly reversed: 
here, neutral German words are judged more often as positive after conflicts as 
compared to after non-conflict primes.  
STUDY 3 was designed to test the hypothesis that conflict aversiveness is the 
motivator of conflict adaptation. To this end, in two standard reaction time tasks (a 
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color version of the Eriksen Flanker task, Experiment 3A; a manual version of the 
Stroop task, Experiment 3B), stimuli’s aversiveness was manipulated by varying 
figure-ground-contrast. Disfluency (reduced figure-ground-contrast) is a known 
source of negative affect. Thus, it was expected that if it is the conflict stimulus’ 
aversiveness that promotes conflict adaptation, disfluent trials should result in 
increased conflict adaptation effects. However, Experiments 3A and 3B yielded 
opposite effects: disfluency resulted in an elimination of conflict adaptation effects. It 
was concluded that in order to motivate adaptation, the aversiveness might have to be 
tied explicitly to the conflict itself rather than to the conflict stimulus in general. 
 
THE MYTH OF THE EMOTIONAL VERSUS THE COGNITVE BRAIN 
 
 
As elaborated in the first part of this thesis, over the past decades there has been a great 
deal of research on the exact function of the ACC. However, one of the most basic 
prevailing questions up to date is whether emotional processes and processes of 
cognitive control are represented in the same anatomical subdivisions of the ACC. 
Dealing with this question, reviews have been published that collected, meta-analyzed 
and (re-)interpreted huge amounts of (neuro-)anatomical, electro-physiological, and 
functional imaging studies. While the earlier reviews (for example, Bush et al., 2002; 
Devinsky, Morrell, & Vogt, 1995) supported a segregated view of ACC functioning, 
in a more recent review, Shackman and colleagues (2011) conclude on the basis of 
new data that gathered along the years that this segregationist model of ACC 
functioning is no longer tenable.  
In that review, Shackman and colleagues report an abundance of studies 
showing that the very same regions of the ACC that are engaged in cognitive control 
processes are also engaged in conditions of autonomic regulation, the perception and 
production of emotion, as well as in the experience of pain and in the experience of 
other aversive stimuli. They also give an overview of the profound structural 
connections between the ACC and other regions highly involved in emotional 
processing, such as the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and facial muscles linked to the 
execution of emotional expressions. Finally, the authors review evidence indicating 
functional convergence of allegedly ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ cognitive processes by showing 
that measures of negative affect and cognitive control covary.  
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Thus, in a nutshell, Shackman and colleagues conclude that the data as 
available in 2011 strongly suggest that the ACC hosts a domain-general process that 
is fundamental to both cognitive control and emotional processes. In their view, the 
activation of the ACC in cognitive control tasks as found in the laboratories today 
actually goes way back to the ACC’s evolutionarily older role of regulating emotional 
processes. That is, Shackman and colleagues put forward that there actually is no such 
thing as a strictly ‘cold’ cognitive process (and consequently that there is no brain 
region that deals with ‘cold’ cognitive processes per se), but that these are more 
abstract instances of ‘hot’ emotional processes that have developed as a byproduct of 
our cognitive evolution.  
In the same line, Inzlicht, Bartholow, and Hirsh (2015) suggest that negative 
affect is a basic aspect of cognitive control, inasmuch as that cognitive control may 
also be understood as an emotional process itself. They argue that when decomposing 
both emotional and cognitive control processes to their more primitive constituting 
elements, their resemblance unfolds. According to Inzlicht and colleagues, both 
episodes of emotional experience (in the classical sense) and episodes of cognitive 
conflict experience can be broken down into three well-defined steps: (1) A preceding 
event that (2) instigates a cascade of different ‘emotional’ primitives such as changes 
in facial expression, affect, physiological responses, subjective experience, attribution, 
and so forth, which eventually (3) motivates the execution of controlled, goal-directed 
behavior. Thus, similar to Shackman and colleagues, Inzlicht and colleagues suggest 
that there is no such thing as an ‘emotional brain’ that processes affective events and 
a ‘cognitive brain’ that processes non-affective events. In their view, cognitive control 
is an instance of emotional processing itself.  
The findings presented in this thesis perfectly fit with this non-segregated view 
of emotional and cognitive processes and fill some small, but important gaps in 
research. Studies 1 and 2 offer evidence that conflicts in information processing, which 
have long been seen as ‘cold’ cognitive phenomena, can actually be interpreted as ‘hot’ 
emotional events that prompt a row of emotional primitives. By 2011, evidence in 
favor of this hypothesis has only been available on a physiological level. That is, while 
there have been studies showing that conflicts activate the same brain region that is 
activated by pain and other aversive stimuli (i.e., the ACC; Shackman et al., 2011) and 
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that furthermore, the experience of conflicts induces an increase in sympathetic 
nervous activity (Hart et al., 2010; Kobayashi et al., 2007), there had been no study 
showing any direct evidence that conflicts are actually experienced as aversive on a 
behavioral level.  
The first study that offered direct evidence that conflicts affect subsequent 
behavior in the same way as more typically considered-so emotional events do was the 
study by Dreisbach and Fischer (2012a), showing that priming with conflict stimuli 
eases the categorization of negative affective word and picture stimuli, most likely by 
pre-activating a negative semantic network. Because the conflict priming effect as 
found in that study was however not unequivocal due to the possibility of a confound 
with processing fluency (see the introduction of Study 1 for a more detailed 
description), the results of Study 1 of this thesis (and its replication in Study 2) offered 
(1) more clear-cut evidence for the aversiveness of conflicts and (2) evidence that 
conflicts induce yet another emotional primitive that is also typically induced by other 
affective stimuli: the negative evaluation of subsequently presented material. Thus, the 
results of studies 1 and 2 further strengthen the comparability between conflicts and 
other emotional events23. 
Furthermore, also the findings of this thesis’ Study 3 fit with the view that there 
exists a domain-general function which is represented in the ACC and which is integral 
to both ‘cognitive’ as well as ‘emotional’ processes. To recapture, in Study 3, it was 
shown that adding unspecific aversiveness on a (mini) block level counteracts conflict 
adaptation. This fits with an idea already claimed by Pessoa in 2009, stating that 
affective and cognitive processes share the same resources, which in effect is 
detrimental under some circumstances. For example, Padmala et al. (2011) found that 
presenting negative pictures in the inter-trial-intervals of a conflict task eliminated 
conflict adaptation. Likewise, it was shown in Study 3 of this thesis that adding 
unspecific aversiveness to small blocks of trials in a conflict task eliminated conflict 
adaptation in these blocks. It seems that in these studies, the processing of negative 
affect used up cognitive resources by occupying domain-general functions that would 
                                                          
23 Schouppe and colleagues (2012) have shown more recently that cognitive conflicts induce avoidance 
behavior in subjects. This adds to the literature presented above and the findings presented in this thesis, 
showing that conflicts cause the same emotional reactions as more typical emotional stimuli do. 
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otherwise have been available for an adaptation to the experience of conflicts. Thus, 
the results of the three studies presented in this thesis advocate the disestablishment of 
a segregationist model of ACC functioning. It would be interesting to examine the 
underlying functional connections of the emotional processes induced by conflict 
stimuli in more detail in future studies.  
  
FIGUREING OUT THE FUNCTION OF CONFLICT AVERSIVENESS 
 
 
To come back to the starting point of this thesis, results of Study 1 (and their replication 
in Study 2) help filling another important gap in research by supporting the underlying 
conclusion made in the extended CMT by Botvinick in 2007. Here, the idea that any 
aversive signal is suited to induce control adaptations implies that conflict stimuli, 
which are known to instigate such control adaptations, do necessarily have to be 
aversive, too. Studies 1 and 2 of this thesis as well as several other recent studies in 
the field (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a; Schouppe et al., 2012; van Steenbergen, Band, 
& Hommel, 2009; 2012) support this conclusion: conflicts are aversive signals. Now, 
not only is this finding bridging the gap between allegedly ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ sights of 
the brain, it is also helpful when trying to understand the mechanism behind conflict 
adaptation. 
The extended CMT, when looked at in a broader context, can be interpreted as 
the neuronal elaboration of a much older concept in psychology: operant conditioning, 
or, more precisely, punishment (Skinner, 1938). According to both the extended 
version of the CMT and operant conditioning theory, aversive events in the processing 
stream lead to adaptations in behavior that make the re-occurrence of these aversive 
events less likely. In the extended version of the CMT, this account is anatomically 
explicated by giving the ACC the role of the ‘aversiveness detector’ and the (dl)PFC 
the role of the executor of behavioral changes. Now, when trying to answer the 
question regarding the function of conflict’s aversiveness, the parallel to Skinner’s 
reinforcement learning account may be helpful. The function of the negative affect as 
induced by conflicts may be that it motivates subsequent behavioral changes, making 
it a necessary precondition for the respective behavioral changes to occur. 
This idea was examined in Study 3 of this thesis. To recapture, negative affect 
was added to small blocks of conflict and non-conflict stimuli by decreasing figure-
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ground contrast (i.e., by adding disfluency, a known inducer of negative affect). The 
results showed that adding unspecific negative affect to a conflict task does not, as 
anticipated, increase, but eliminate conflict adaptation. This result was unexpected at 
first sight, but when looked at closer, fits very well with the idea that the aversiveness 
that actually motivates task-benefitting strategy changes has to be tied to the specific 
task itself. For example, in the study by Dreisbach and Fischer (2011), the task was to 
categorize number words as fast as possible, and thus the negative affective experience 
of a disfluent, hard-to-read trial resulted in a subsequent change in the perceptual 
processing of exactly these number words. While in Study 3 of the present thesis, 
perceptual disfluency of conflict trials may also have changed subsequent 
perceptual/semantic processing in general, it did not cause enhanced shielding from 
interference. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that only conflict-induced negative 
affect triggers processes of conflict adaptation. Intuitively, this seems also to be the 
most appropriate strategy for adaptive organisms: to prepare specifically for the event 
that most recently caused distress24.  
While the results of Study 3 offer support for the idea that the behavioral 
changes that manifest after experiencing negative affect are tied specifically to an 
improvement in dealing with the negative affect’s source, the question of the exact role 
of conflict aversiveness in conflict adaptation is still open to debate. The best way to 
directly test the hypothesis that conflict adaptation depends on conflict aversiveness 
would be to manipulate the aversiveness induced by a conflict stimulus without 
changing the conflict magnitude itself. Actually, there have been studies reporting 
decreased ERN amplitudes and post-error adjustment after alcohol consumption 
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2002) or anxiolytic drug intake (de Bruijn, Hulstijn, Verkes, 
Ruigt, & Sabbe, 2004; McNaughton, Swart, Neo, Bates, & Glue, 2013). Critically, 
these effects are supposed to be mediated by a drug-induced decrease in the negative 
affect caused by errors (Bartholow, Henry, Lust, Saults, & Wood, 2012; see also 
Inzlicht et al., 2015). However, though the results of these studies are very promising, 
the fact that the effects of psychopharmacological medication on information 
                                                          
24 This fits with studies showing cross-task adaptations only under circumstances of high stimulus 
similarity (Kunde & Wühr, 2006; Notebaert & Verguts, 2006). However, it seems reasonable that there 
still are other, more general adaptations in reaction to negative affect that operate in parallel to more 
specific processes. An example for such more general adaptation effects might be the more cautious 
behavior after errors, the so-called post-error slowing (Botvinick et al., 2001). 
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processing are manifold and still largely unknown advocates for a cautious 
interpretation thereof. 
Another plausible way to test the functional relevance of conflict aversiveness 
in conflict adaptation would be to investigate the co-variation of inter-individual 
differences in conflict priming and conflict adaptation effects. More specifically, it 
would be interesting to see if participants who show strong conflict priming effects 
(i.e., experience strong negative affect induced by conflicts) also show increased 
conflict adaptation effects (i.e., are more motivated to adapt because of the more 
negative conflict experience). When designing such an experiment, it would be crucial 
to also control for mediator variables that may alienate real effects. For example, it 
might be that some individuals indeed experience conflicts in information processing 
as negative, but lack the cognitive resources needed to resolve them properly. For 
example, there have been studies showing that individuals with high trait anxiety  
respond to errors with enhanced ACC activation (Cavanagh & Shackman, 2014; 
Moser, Moran, Schroder, Donnellan, & Yeung, 2013), but fail to use these aversive 
signals adaptively (Bishop, 2008; Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011). Recent theories 
assume that the extreme sensitivity of highly anxious people to potential threat results 
in a constant distraction from active goal maintenance by (potentially dangerous) 
environmental stimuli. Thus, first, trait anxious individuals have less resources 
available to support cognitive control processes (Pessoa, 2009) and, second, the 
negative affect of conflict stimuli, against a background of many other stimuli that are 
subjectively experienced as aversive, may not be as prompting as in healthy or 
‘normally’ anxious people (see Inzlicht et al., 2015, Box 2, for a distinguished 
summary of current literature on that topic).  
Transferred to the design of Study 3 of the present thesis, the interpretation of 
anxious individual’s incapacity to make use of conflict aversiveness in an adaptive 
way bears an interesting idea for future usage of this paradigm. Disfluent blocks could 
be interpreted as experimental inductions of highly trait anxious people’s natural 
environment, making it impossible to adapt to conflicts when there is a lot of added 
potential threat, i.e., negative affect induced by disfluency. Thus, the paradigm of 
Study 3 could be used as a more direct measure of trait anxiety (compared to 
questionnaires), in such a way that people with higher levels of trait anxiety should 
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show worse conflict adaptation than people with lower levels of trait anxiety, 
especially so in disfluent blocks. In the same line, it might also be used as a treatment 
check: symptom improvement in the cause of psychological or medical therapy should 
go along with improvements in conflict adaptation effects for trait anxious people, 
especially so in disfluent blocks. 
To sum up, while more direct evidence for a causal role of conflict aversiveness 
in conflict adaptation is still missing, results that favor this idea are proliferating. Next 
to studies already mentioned above (Bartholow et al., 2012; van Steenbergen et al., 
2009; 2012), other work that has to be mentioned in this context is a very recent study 
by Desender, van Opstal, and van den Bussche (2014). Here, subjects participated in 
a masked conflict priming paradigm and were asked after each trial if they had 
experienced a conflict or not. Results of that study showed that conflict adaptation was 
only present when participants stated to have actually experienced the previous 
conflict. That is, the authors conclude, what drives conflict adaptation is not conflict 
per se, but it’s subjective experience. In future studies, it would be interesting to more 
precisely analyze what subjective experience it actually is that lets participants reach 
the conclusion to have experienced a conflict – it might be that it is the experience of 
aversiveness, after all. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The findings presented in this thesis add to an increasing field of research that supports 
the establishment of a non-segregated view of emotional and cognitive processes: 
conflicts, formerly believed to be ‘cold’ cognitive processes, are experienced as 
aversive and induce emotional primitives such as negative evaluation (Studies 1 and 
2). Moreover, the results presented in this thesis highlight the importance of negative 
affect in behavioral control. Based on the studies presented here (particularly Study 3) 
as well as work recently published by other labs, it seems that the function of conflict-
induced aversiveness is to motivate the system to engage in behavior that counteracts 
the experience of negative affect. Depending on the situation at hand, the counteraction 
of negative affect is realized by either the elimination of its cause (if, for example, 
conflict solution is possible) or by more direct affective counter-regulation strategies 
(if, for example, conflict solution is impossible, see Study 2). Thus, together with other 
recent research, the results of this thesis suggest that conflict aversiveness is mandatory 
for conflict adaptation (and for affect regulation in general). This assumption offers 
fruitful soil for future research and will certainly be tested more specifically in future 
studies.  
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